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1Introduction 
by  MAT THEW A.  ROSENSTEIN
In his 2004 memoir Engaging India: Diplomacy, 
Democracy, and the Bomb, Strobe Talbott describes 
the reaction in Washington, DC after US officials 
first learned that India had detonated several nuclear 
devices in the desert in the Indian state of Rajasthan. 
Talbott, who was Deputy Secretary of State during 
Bill Clinton’s presidency, explains that with its May 
1998 nuclear tests, India graduated from its previ-
ously permanent status of “merely important” to 
“urgent” on the American diplomatic agenda. Despite 
calls for restraint, Pakistan followed India with 
nuclear tests of its own later that month. One can 
reasonably assert that both India and Pakistan have 
consistently commanded serious, if not perpetually 
urgent, attention from the United States and the 
international community ever since. 
!is issue of Swords and Ploughshares examines 
the impacts that can be discerned today, twelve 
years later, from the decision in 1998 by India and 
Pakistan to make their nuclear weapons capabilities 
overt. Topics such as the military balance between the 
two countries and their relative positions within the 
global strategic power structure inform the discus-
sion here. !is collection of articles also seeks to 
characterize South Asia’s nuclearization particularly 
within the context of several new developments that 
have occurred since May 1998, and which have either 
already altered the regional and global security land-
scapes, or promise future qualitative shifts, including:
O a military conflict between nuclear-armed India 
and Pakistan (the 1999 Kargil War), as well as 
multiple full-scale army mobilizations on both 
sides during later periods of high tension; 
O the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and 
Washington, the resulting war on terror against Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, and stepped up US economic aid to Pakistan 
in exchange for its cooperation in the war;
O the exposure of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s 
elaborate nuclear proliferation network;
O the strengthening of the strategic partnership 
between India and the United States, includ-
ing their agreement to engage in civilian nuclear 
trade;
O domestic political changes in Pakistan, India, and 
the United States, with the parties in the ascen-
dancy having shifted in the latter two cases, while 
in Pakistan civilian democratic governance was 
restored in 2008 after nine years of military rule 
under General Pervez Musharraf;
O and calls for renewed commitment to global 
nuclear disarmament efforts, signaled by US 
President Barack Obama’s Prague speech of April 
2009.
!is publication starts from the premise that the 
passage of twelve years offers sufficient time to draw 
some conclusions about the motives for the 1998 
nuclear tests, their meaning, and the implications for 
not only the India-Pakistan relationship but also the 
global nonproliferation regime. In the first article, 
P.R. Chari provides a thoughtful retrospective on the 
political climate that led to the 1998 tests by India 
and Pakistan, as well as the incremental steps that the 
two countries took towards nuclear weapons develop-
ment in the preceding decades. !e author goes on 
to explore the question of whether India and Pakistan 
have sufficient confidence in their nuclear weapons 
designs in order not to require further testing. Chari 
also touches on whether nuclearization has increased 
or decreased stability between India and Pakistan, 
an important problem that has concerned military 
strategists in both countries and the international 
scholarly community alike. With every crisis—
Operation Brasstacks in 1986–87 (during what were 
undoubtedly “latent proliferation” stages for both 
India and Pakistan); the 1999 Kargil conflict; and 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in December 
2001 on the Indian parliament and in November 
2008 on Mumbai, both attributed to Pakistani-based 
militants—questions are raised about whether the 
presence of nuclear weapons encourages military 
adventurism or, conversely, fosters restraint, and 
whether each rival can truly know the other’s “red 
line,” the crossing of which might instigate a nuclear 
strike. Chari suggests that the jury is still out on these 
questions.
 In the next article, Bharath Gopalaswamy and 
Moeed Yusuf highlight the diverse strategic and tech-
nical considerations that contribute to the fashion-
ing of a de facto nuclear weapons state. While India 
has enunciated a relatively clear nuclear doctrine, 
Pakistan has found strategic benefits from keeping its 
nuclear posture deliberately ambiguous. In addition 
to discussing the policy aspects that both sides have 
taken into account in constructing their doctrines, 
2Gopalaswamy and Yusuf describe the recent historical 
and current research and development activities on 
delivery systems by India and Pakistan. While the 
1998 tests showed that both countries had sufficient 
fissile materials, scientific knowledge, and engineering 
mastery to achieve nuclear explosions, the demon-
strated ability to deliver the bomb to an adversary’s 
territory constitutes another essential part of nuclear 
deterrence. As the authors show, both India and Paki-
stan have invested heavily in their missile programs 
over the past decade. With the corresponding higher 
level of precision, reach, and destructive capacity, 
they caution, comes an even greater obligation to 
ensure that confidence building measures are imple-
mented to avoid catastrophic mistakes.
A central US and international concern in 
the post-9/11 environment has been the security 
of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex. Rizwan 
Zeb cautions against singular preoccupation with 
Pakistan, however, while giving other nuclear-armed 
states a free pass. One major thread of his argument 
essentially derives from the dictum “people who live 
in glass houses should not throw stones.” To be sure, 
Pakistan has a particularly dangerous mix of radical-
ism, weak governance, and a growing nuclear arsenal, 
all points which Zeb acknowledges, leading him to 
cite conventional wisdom on perceived threats to 
Pakistan’s nuclear security. Nevertheless, he reminds 
us, the United States and Russia have their share 
of “loose nukes” episodes as well. As another line 
of argument, Zeb offers up that while Pakistan has 
gained notoriety for the nuclear black market activi-
ties of A.Q. Khan, the father of its bomb, people tend 
not to acknowledge that no similar activities have 
come to light since Khan’s house arrest; the country’s 
highly trained professional military has instituted a 
robust command and control structure, making theft 
or accidents far less likely; and Pakistan has acceded 
to several multilateral agreements expressly designed 
to enhance nuclear safety and security. Zeb implies 
that although there is more work to be done, the situ-
ation may not be as dire as commonly presented.
Another significant development that invites a 
reassessment of nuclear South Asia is the agreement, 
announced in 2005 and approved in 2008, between 
the United States and India to engage in civilian 
nuclear cooperation. Dinshaw Mistry examines two 
major criticisms that have been directed at the agree-
ment, namely its potential to undermine the global 
nonproliferation regime and to incite a regional 
nuclear arms race. Mistry’s analysis carefully points 
out that the end results are not foregone conclusions, 
but rather depend quite a bit on how the specific 
parameters of the nuclear deal are interpreted over 
time by India and other countries, and what addi-
tional nonproliferation steps might follow through 
proactive efforts to address the concerns that have 
been raised. Mistry also points out that there are 
possible positive consequences, with increased pres-
sure on India to refrain from further nuclear testing, 
and increased cooperation across numerous sectors 
between India and the United States. Mistry closes 
the article with detailed accounting of the economic 
and environmental implications of the agreement.
Pakistan and India did not sign the 1968 Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), effectively meaning 
that for over forty years the two South Asian rivals 
have rejected the norms of global nonprolifera-
tion efforts. As officials from both countries have 
intimated, however, they see little shame in bucking 
an international regime that only serves to promote 
what then-Indian Minister for External Affairs 
Jaswant Singh referred to as “nuclear apartheid” in 
a 1998 Foreign Affairs article. Indeed, one cannot 
dismiss the fact that the indefinite extension of 
the NPT in 1995, while interpreted as a success in 
some quarters, from the perspective of others merely 
signaled that the existing nuclear weapons states 
would defer indefinitely their commitment to disarm 
fully. Nevertheless, once again momentum has been 
growing to pursue arms control and disarmament 
steps more earnestly, including calls from President 
Obama and numerous other high-profile public 
figures to make the complete abolition of nuclear 
weapons the ultimate goal. In the final article of 
this issue, T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj and Clifford Singer 
discuss a particularly crucial instrument for revers-
ing the trend towards further nuclear proliferation, a 
fissile materials production cutoff treaty, or FMCT. 
!e authors provide a thorough analysis of the key 
stumbling blocks to achieving a breakthrough on an 
FMCT, before evaluating the fissile inventories and 
options of India and Pakistan as two critical players 
in the debate. Rethinaraj and Singer are cautious 
in their forecast for success in arriving at a treaty or 
at least a fissile material production moratorium. 
Nevertheless, the potential approaches they outline 
invite policymakers from India, Pakistan, and the 
international community to resist allowing inertia to 
dictate the terms of their diplomatic efforts. Fittingly, 
and consistent with the messages to be found in each 
of the articles in this issue, the authors note that 
the leadership in both India and Pakistan can make 
conscious choices towards reducing nuclear tensions, 
but the burden is not theirs alone and must also 
be encouraged by parallel gestures from the United 
States, Russia, China, and other states possessing or 
pursuing nuclear weapons. 
3Short Takes
Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.
—!e Bhagavad Gita (Hindu epic), quoted by J. Robert Oppenheimer, while viewing the first US nuclear test in  
New Mexico, 1945
We do not want to cover our action with a veil of needless ambiguity. India is now a 
nuclear weapons state. Ours will never be weapons of aggression.
—Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, interview in India Today published May 25, 1998, two weeks after India’s nuclear tests
We were never trying to get into the nuclear race in the first place.
—Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, statement on May 28, 1998 following Pakistan’s nuclear tests
The most dangerous place in the world, I think you could argue, is the Indian 
subcontinent and the line of control in Kashmir.
—US President Bill Clinton, March 2000
It was a summer of great rumblings in the belly of the earth, of atomic flatulence 
and geopolitical indigestion, consequences of the consumption of sectarian chickpeas 
by our famished and increasingly incontinent subcontinent.
—Pakistani author Mohsin Hamid in his novel Moth Smoke (published in 2000), on the summer of 1998 in South Asia
I am concerned about a trend that we see reflected in the US-India nuclear deal 
where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character of regimes and 
governments.
—Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, "e Australian, April 13, 2006
I want to assure the world that the nuclear capability of Pakistan is under safe 
hands.
—Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, as reported by Reuters, April 27, 2009
4Articles
 At the heart of India’s 
decades-long nuclear quest 
lies resentment of the NPT’s 
exclusion of India from 
the higher councils of the 
international system.
 An immediate conse-
quence of India’s 1974 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion 
was that Pakistan acceler-
ated its nuclear quest status, 
which had secretly begun 
in 1972.
Reflections and Lessons Learned 
from the Indian and Pakistani 
1998 Nuclear Tests
by  P.R.  CHARI
One can evade the question and dissemble that 
we are too near the nuclear tests conducted in May 
1998 by India, closely followed by Pakistan, for their 
implications to be analyzed with any authority. But 
twelve years is long enough to discern the influence 
of these nuclear tests on their national security and 
the non-proliferation regime. Before attempting this 
analysis it would be instructive to note the “creeping 
proliferation” route pursued by India to exercise its 
military nuclear option. 
A Potted History of India’s Nuclearization
India’s military nuclear quest began in October 1964 
when China exploded its first nuclear device. Occur-
ring as it did within two years of China inflicting a 
humiliating defeat on India in the Sino-Indian border 
conflict of November 1962, the Chinese test inspired 
an alarmed debate in the Indian Parliament. Heckled 
by the Opposition, India’s then Prime Minister, Lal 
Bahadur Shastri, was forced to concede that India’s 
commitment to use atomic energy for only peace-
ful purposes was not immutable. A Subterranean 
Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP) was authorized 
by him to proceed “up to a point where, once the go-
ahead signal was given, it would take three months 
to have an explosion.” !e SNEP was abandoned 
in 1966 after the death of both Shastri and Homi 
Bhabha, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
who favored India’s nuclearization. !eir successors, 
Indira Gandhi and Homi Sethna, had no interest in 
continuing this program. On the technical side, India 
then possessed an autonomous plutonium source 
after its 40 MW CIRUS reactor went critical in 1960 
and a plutonium reprocessing plant was completed 
in 1964. Neither facility was safeguarded, but India 
made extraordinary efforts to emphasize their peace-
ful intent, while avoiding any commitments that it 
had forsaken their use for military purposes in future. 
India had initially supported, but later eschewed, 
entering the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
negotiated in July 1968, on the major grounds that 
it was plainly undemocratic in holding that: “For 
purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is 
one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 
January 1, 1967.” India continues to believe that its 
restraint in not testing a nuclear device before this 
cutoff date successfully excluded it from the Nuclear 
Club, a cartel made final in 1995, when the NPT 
was extended in perpetuity. At the heart of India’s 
decades-long nuclear quest lies this resentment of the 
NPT’s exclusion of India from the higher councils of 
the international system. 
1974 and 1998
Fast forward to May 18, 1974 when India defiantly 
conducted its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), 
ostensibly to study their feasibility for undertaking 
developmental tasks like excavating reservoirs and 
canals, leveling hills and so on. Since India had not 
entered the NPT and had utilized its un-safeguarded 
and autonomously established nuclear facilities to 
derive fissile materials for its PNE, its legal position 
was unassailable. !e NPT, incidentally, recognizes 
the “potential benefits from…peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions.” Why India conducted this PNE 
but did not proceed further to explore their devel-
opmental possibilities, or change course to estab-
lish a nuclear arsenal, remains inexplicable to this 
day. Speculatively, an amalgam of security, prestige 
considerations, and domestic political motives were 
operating. But, the event indubitably had serious 
implications for the security of South Asia and 
the viability of the international non-proliferation 
regime. 
An immediate consequence of the PNE was that 
Pakistan accelerated its nuclear quest status, which 
had secretly begun in 1972, shortly after Pakistan’s 
humiliating defeat by India in December 1971 that 
had led to the excision of East Pakistan and the cre-
ation of Bangladesh. !e parallel between Pakistan’s 
dilemma in 1974 and India’s quandary in 1964 is 
most striking. At the international level the severe 
disapprobation of India’s radical action led to adverse 
repercussions on its atomic energy program. Canada 
cancelled its assistance for the two Rajasthan power 
plants, and supplies of low-enriched uranium for the 
U.S. supplied Tarapur reactors became problematical. 
!e establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
5 The Bush Administration 
concluded that the political 
dimensions of the Indo-U.S. 
relationship were more 
important than pursuing the 
non-proliferation ideal.
 After India tested in May 
1998, it was a foregone con-
clusion that Pakistan would 
test its nuclear devices, 
which it did within a fortnight 
of the Indian tests, suggest-
ing its readiness to meet this 
contingency.
(London Club) in 1974 and passage of the U.S. 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978 designed to 
deny and constrain nuclear technology transfers are 
other fallouts directly attributable to India’s PNE. 
India and Pakistan, however, continued with their 
military nuclear programs, and it became apparent 
soon that they either possessed a “bomb in the base-
ment” or a bomb requiring only that the “last wires 
be connected.” !e nuclear history of South Asia 
over the eighties and nineties is marked by recurrent 
India-Pakistan crises—rumors of India attacking 
Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in the mid-eighties, the 
Brasstacks exercise in 1986–87, and the Kashmir-
related Spring crisis (1990). !e state of existential 
deterrence existing between them, however, helped 
maintain the peace.
Fast forward again to May 11 and 13, 1998 when 
India conducted five nuclear tests, closely followed 
by Pakistan’s six tests on May 28 and 30. !ey 
heralded the forced entry of India and Pakistan into 
the Nuclear Club as de facto nuclear weapon states, 
marking a cataclysm in the international system. 
Angry reactions emanated from the United States and 
China. Sanctions were imposed on both countries 
under Section 102 of the U.S. Arms Export Control 
Act (Glenn Amendment), leading to the termina-
tion of foreign aid and sale of defense items, and the 
denial of credit and loans by the U.S. Government 
and banks, which had serious financial repercussions 
on their economies. Despite these knee-jerk reac-
tions, particularly by the Clinton Administration, 
the rigors of these sanctions have eroded over time. 
!e Bush Administration concluded that the political 
dimensions of the Indo-U.S. relationship were more 
important than pursuing the non-proliferation ideal, 
highlighting the tensions marking the American non-
proliferation policy that wishes to balance its regional 
compulsions with its non-proliferation concerns. 
!ese perceptions in Washington partly explain the 
rationale underlying the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.
Major Issues of Relevance
!ere are at least five parameters along which the 
implications of the nuclear tests conducted by India 
and Pakistan might be evaluated. 
O First, were the reasons that persuaded India to 
conduct its nuclear tests on May 11 and 13 
plausible? Were Pakistan’s reasons for explod-
ing its nuclear devices thereafter on May 28 and 
30 explicable? Considerable embarrassment was 
caused by a confidential letter dispatched by 
India to the heads of governments around the 
world stating its rationale for conducting the 
tests leaking to the press. It identified the security 
threats emanating from China and Pakistan 
and their collusion against India as its rationale, 
provoking an angry response from China. Security 
threats apart, the ideological convictions of the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) govern-
ment—led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—
were responsible, as also the pressure of the 
nuclear scientists, who favored India going nuclear 
for institutional reasons. It is unclear whether the 
certainty that Pakistan would follow suit, which 
it did, was taken into account by Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee in deciding to hold the tests. 
After India tested, it was a foregone conclusion 
that Pakistan would test its nuclear devices, which 
it did within a fortnight of the Indian tests, sug-
gesting its readiness to meet this contingency. It 
was naïve of the Clinton Administration, there-
fore, to have imagined that it could have deflected 
Pakistan from testing its devices.
O Second, have the test results proved reassuring 
enough for both countries to go ahead with estab-
lishing their nuclear stockpiles? Little is known of 
Pakistan’s confidence levels, except that its nuclear 
weapons are based on Chinese designs, and 
should be robust. But, much uncertainty underlies 
India’s confidence in its nuclear weapons’ designs. 
Apropos, India’s five nuclear tests included three 
“sub-kiloton” devices, a 15-kiloton fission device 
(similar to its PNE), and a 45-kiloton thermonu-
clear device (hydrogen bomb). Some controversy 
attaches to whether the thermonuclear device 
tested was actually a boosted fission device. India 
then announced a moratorium on further nuclear 
testing, which has been reiterated in the Indo-
U.S. nuclear deal agreement. But its reluctance 
to convert this moratorium into a permanent 
renunciation of nuclear testing suggests that it has 
no confidence in new weapon designs that might 
be developed, which is understandable since pru-
dence demands that they should be field-tested. 
Computer simulations or sub-critical laboratory 
testing are obviously insufficient to inspire confi-
dence in the armed forces. 
  !e germane question is: what confidence does 
India have about using the data generated by its 
five tests to develop more sophisticated designs by, 
for instance, reducing the weight to yield ratio of 
its nuclear weapons. It was stated after the nuclear 
tests that they “have significantly enhanced our 
capability in computer simulation of new designs 
and taken us to the stage of ‘subcritical’ experi-
ments in the future.” !is vague terminology 
suggests that India may have confidence in the 
nuclear weapon designs that it has tested, but has 
doubts about the new designs that might be devel-
oped in future.
 
6O !ird, did these reciprocal nuclear tests by India 
and Pakistan, followed by their announcement 
that they had become nuclear weapon powers, 
confer this status on them? !e short answer is 
no, and official propaganda to this effect is wholly 
misleading. As apparent, neither country had 
exploded a nuclear device before the presumptive 
date of January 1, 1967. What this means is that 
they might consider themselves and be considered 
by the international community to be de facto 
nuclear weapon states, but they can never be de 
jure nuclear weapon states unless the NPT is 
appropriately amended.
O Fourth, did these reciprocal nuclear tests moderate 
their adversarial relations and establish a modicum 
of stability in their relationship? Both countries 
indubitably achieved nuclear parity, which was 
reflected during the Kargil conflict in 1999. India 
could not enlarge its operational theater, or cross 
the Line of Control (LOC) to attack the staging 
bases of the Pakistani intruders; neither could 
Pakistan relieve pressure on its beleaguered troops 
by enlarging the operations. !e state of nuclear 
deterrence obtaining was more clearly demon-
strated during the 2001–2 border confrontation 
crisis when a million troops from both countries 
faced each other across the international border 
and the LOC. A tinderbox situation was created, 
but war was averted, and the two countries 
withdrew their armed forces after a ten-month 
long sitzkrieg. However, the deterrence provided 
by the nuclear tests did add to instabilities in the 
short term due to increased cross-border terrorism 
sponsored by Pakistan. 
  But, soon thereafter in October 2003, over-
tures were made by both countries to establish a 
ceasefire along the LOC, which had become the 
theater for regular cross-border artillery duels. 
!e ceasefire negotiated along the LOC was later 
extended to the Siachen glacier, where an unde-
clared war had been proceeding since the mid-
eighties. !ese ceasefires have held to date, and 
been consolidated by several confidence-building 
measures (CBMs) reached by the two countries, 
including some addressing the nuclear threat. 
People-to-people relations have strengthened, 
notably by opening new land routes and com-
munications, particularly across the LOC between 
the two parts of the former State of Kashmir. It 
is, therefore, arguable that, over the long run, 
the nuclear tests have succeeded in stabilizing 
India-Pakistan relations, although it is too early 
to pronounce final judgment in this matter. !e 
uncertainty factors hinge around the effect of a 
catastrophic event occurring in either country, but 
more especially the internal stability of Pakistan, 
its success in arresting growing Islamic fundamen-
talism, and the likely future role of its Inter-Ser-
vices Intelligence.
O Fifth, did these nuclear tests weaken the inter-
national nuclear regime? !e short answer here 
is, yes. Most visibly they brought that tottering 
regime into greater crisis by highlighting the 
grim prospect of more countries crashing into 
the Nuclear Club, besides the de jure five, and 
the de facto three viz. India, Pakistan and Israel. 
Libya undoubtedly represents a success story for 
the international nuclear regime. But, over the 
past decade North Korea has joined the de facto 
three nuclear weapon states after its abortive (?) 
nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, while Iran is 
determinedly pursuing its nuclear quest. !e overt 
nuclearization of North Korea and Iran raises the 
specter of a domino effect excoriating Northeast 
Asia and the Gulf region by raising the prospect 
of tensions and instabilities escalating in two of 
the most sensitive regions of the world. !e May 
1998 nuclear tests in South Asia have indubitably 
encouraged this process of incipient proliferation. 
Strenuous attempts by India’s nuclear Ayatollahs 
to portray them as strengthening the regime by 
placing the nuclear weapon states on notice to 
proceed expeditiously towards nuclear disarma-
ment or deal with a world of many nuclear powers 
are self-serving overstatements to disguise the role 
of India and Pakistan in burying the international 
nuclear regime. 
Conclusions
What is the total message conveyed by the nuclear 
tests conducted by India and Pakistan over a decade 
ago? It is unfair to deny their stabilizing role on the 
adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, 
although the costs of conflict will now be much 
higher if nuclear weapons enter the scene. But it 
would also be unfair to ignore that nuclear deterrence 
has no relevance to the vast range of security threats 
relevant now to India-Pakistan relations, which 
include religious fundamentalism, Leftist and other 
forms of extremism, terrorism and insurgency—
indigenous, regional and international—and the 
non-military threats arising from global factors 
like migration, environmental decay, and climate 
change—briefly, the downside of globalization. !e 
reciprocal nuclear tests conducted by India and 
Pakistan are irrelevant to these present and future 
security threats. !e current stabilization of their 
relations engendered by these tests is therefore brittle, 
but could be profitably used by them to address their 
real security threats, provided wise leadership guides 
New Delhi and Islamabad. However, the Mumbai 
attacks in November 2008 testify to an uneasy peace 
 India’s reluctance to 
convert its announced 
moratorium into a permanent 
renunciation of nuclear 
testing suggests that it has 
no confidence in new weapon 
designs that might be 
developed.
 India and Pakistan might 
consider themselves and be 
considered by the interna-
tional community to be de 
facto nuclear weapon states, 
but they can never be de 
jure nuclear weapon states 
unless the NPT is appropri-
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7existing in South Asia under the rubric of an uncer-
tain nuclear deterrent relationship between India and 
Pakistan.
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the long run, the nuclear 
tests have succeeded in 
stabilizing India-Pakistan 
relations, although it is too 
early to pronounce final judg-
ment in this matter.
 The May 1998 nuclear 
tests in South Asia have 
indubitably encouraged the 
process of incipient prolif-
eration by others.
8Nuclear South Asia: Implications 
of the Indian and Pakistani 
Arsenals
by  BHARATH GOPAL ASWAMY and  MOEED 
YUSUF 
India’s and Pakistan’s respective nuclear explosions in 
Pokhran and the Ras Koh mountain range presented 
the world with two more nuclear weapons states. On 
May 11 and 13, 1998 India conducted a total of five 
tests: three low yield explosions for tactical nuclear 
weapons, a 12 kiloton (kt) fission bomb, and a 43 kt 
thermonuclear device. !ese tests were met with a 
Pakistani response on May 28 and 30, when Islam-
abad conducted six tests, with yields ranging from 3 
kt to 30 kt (Sikka 2000). By carrying out these tests, 
the countries gate crashed the nuclear club and put 
in their applications to be recognized as “nuclear 
weapons states.”
As Scott Sagan explains, for the foreseeable future 
it is clear that nuclear weapons will remain an integral 
part of South Asia, affirming the region’s reputation 
as a dangerous place. While the nuclear deterrence 
system between India and Pakistan is much smaller 
and arguably less complex than the one that existed 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the cold war, the South Asian equation throws 
up its own set of challenges, which leave little room 
for complacency. Unless and until the underlying 
points of discord, mainly centered around the territo-
rial dispute over Kashmir, are addressed, the threat of 
conflict will remain current. !e concern is further 
compounded by the presence of nuclear weapons on 
both sides, coupled with inadequate warning systems 
in place and short flight timings due to geographi-
cal contiguity of the two rivals, which make the 
timelines for decision making extremely compressed. 
In addition, there are legitimate concerns about social 
stability in both countries, especially in Pakistan, 
that could compromise nuclear weapons safety and 
security. Ensuring strategic stability in South Asia 
thus remains a significant challenge, but one from 
which the international community—and primarily 
the United States—cannot shy away due to strategic 
interests (Sagan 2004).
!is article briefly describes the nuclear weapons 
policies of India and Pakistan and their current 
nuclear weapons delivery capabilities, with particular 
attention given here to their missile programs, before 
highlighting the potential concerns attributable to the 
South Asian nuclear calculus.
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India started its nuclear program in the 1950s under 
the “Atoms for Peace” program, and subsequently 
established a large civil and military infrastructure 
dedicated to nuclear development. India initiated its 
nuclear weapons program after China conducted a 
nuclear explosion in 1964, two years removed from 
a brief border war between the two countries that 
resulted in an Indian defeat. !ough countering Paki-
stan remains a top priority for India, India also seems 
intent on challenging China for primacy in the Asia 
Pacific and is drafting its nuclear and foreign policy 
accordingly. !e nation’s strategic and political elite 
had been engaged in an effort to arrive at a broad 
consensus on the nature and the scope of the nuclear 
program ever since India conducted its first “peace-
ful nuclear explosion” in 1974 (Perkovich 2000). 
!is debate assumed a new significance when India 
conducted the 1998 tests and followed up with a dec-
laration of its nuclear doctrine. In January 2003, the 
Indian government unveiled a set of political prin-
ciples and administrative arrangements to manage its 
arsenal of nuclear weapons. !e main elements of its 
nuclear doctrine are:
 
O Building and maintaining a credible deterrent;
O A posture of No First Use (NFU);
O Retaliatory attacks only to be authorized by the 
civilian political leadership through the Nuclear 
Command Authority (NCA);
O Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
weapon states;
O Retaining the option of retaliating with nuclear 
weapons in the event of a major attack against 
India or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or 
chemical weapons;
O A continuance of controls on export of nuclear 
and missile related materials and technologies, 
participation in the Fissile Material Cut-Off 
Treaty (FMCT) negotiations, observance of 
the moratorium on nuclear tests, and universal 
nuclear disarmament (Pant and Gopalaswamy 
2008; Pant 2005). 
 
!e declaration of its nuclear doctrine and 
creation of the NCA by India formalized what had 
been essentially a set of unstructured arrangements 
among senior members of the politico-military-
scientific establishment (Perkovich 2000). !e new 
framework provided the doctrinal underpinning to 
India’s evolving nuclear posture and the sanctity of 
government approval for the use of nuclear weapons. 
Maximum restraint in the use of nuclear forces, 
absolute political control over decision making and 
an attempt to evolve an effective interface between 
civilian and military leaders in the administration of 
its nuclear arsenal have emerged as the basic tenets 
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9of India’s nuclear weapons policy. !e declaration 
of its nuclear doctrine and installation of the NCA 
by India marked a significant step in India’s plan to 
develop effective, robust command and control and 
indications-and-warning systems and infrastructure 
for its strategic nuclear forces commensurate with 
India’s strategic requirements.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was a response 
to the country’s humiliating loss of the war to India 
over the erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) 
in 1971. !e defeat triggered a political decision 
in January 1972 under the then Prime Minister 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to begin a crash nuclear weapons 
program (Ahmed 1999). Pakistan, otherwise pos-
sessing modest technological capabilities, sought 
technology from many sources. Assistance to Pakistan 
included uranium technology from Europe, as well 
as blueprints for a small nuclear weapon and missile 
technology from China and North Korea (Squas-
soni 2004). Although Pakistan has not enunciated 
a nuclear doctrine, the Director General of the 
Strategic Plans Division, Gen. Khalid Kidwai, has 
identified four conditions under which Pakistan 
would consider employing nuclear weapons: (i) India 
attacks Pakistan and takes a large part of its territory, 
(ii) India destroys a large part of Pakistani armed 
forces, (iii) India imposes an economic blockade on 
Pakistan, and (iv) India creates political destabiliza-
tion or large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan 
(Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini 2002). It is obvious 
from this that the Pakistani program is India specific; 
it is seen as the key to offsetting Indian conventional 
military superiority. Formally, Pakistan espouses to 
a “credible minimum deterrent” policy, the “cred-
ible” being a dynamic concept benchmarked against 
Indian capability. By all indications, Pakistan is after 
a modest sized program; currently it is believed to 
have a stockpile of 70-90 warheads (Federation of 
American Scientists 2010). Being the convention-
ally weaker party, Pakistan has rejected the doctrine 
of no-first-use. It fears that giving up the option of 
employing nuclear weapons except in retaliation may 
allow India to overrun it conventionally.1 !erefore, 
even though Pakistan’s averseness to use of nuclear 
weapons is inescapable given that an Indian retalia-
tion would virtually wipe Pakistan off the map, it uses 
1  In November 2008, Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari 
made headlines with comments that Pakistan would not be 
the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. Some defense 
analysts quickly labeled Zardari’s remarks as “uninformed” 
or “off-the-cuff,” noting that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence 
capabilities are in part predicated on ambiguity with 
respect to first use.
the option of a nuclear launch as a deterrent against 
Indian conventional aggression.
Global concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program 
have remained higher than India’s from the very 
beginning. Initially, Pakistan’s anomalous civil-
military equation and the Army’s traditional de facto 
veto over national security issues worried many. 
While that concern remained, subsequently the A. 
Q. Khan proliferation scandal hit center stage and 
confirmed the worst fears of many outside observers. 
!e “Father of the Pakistani bomb” was found to be 
running a nuclear black market without the knowl-
edge of the Pakistani state (International Institute of 
Strategic Studies 2007). Finally, the growing instabil-
ity within Pakistan at the behest of Islamist militants 
continues to raise concerns as well. Ironic as it is, 
these international concerns have forced the Pakistani 
strategic enclave to treat nuclear safety and security 
as an utmost priority and share as much informa-
tion as possible to comfort external powers. Nuclear 
decision making is managed through the ten-member 
National Command Authority (NCA), which was 
set up in February 2000. !e body is tasked with 
policy formulation and control over development and 
decision-making of the country’s strategic nuclear 
forces (Luongo and Salik 2007). !e NCA consists 
of senior cabinet members and the military top brass. 
!e Prime Minister chairs the NCA and has the final 
say. Under outside pressure, Pakistan has also been 
working to tighten export controls and has gone 
to lengths to convince the world that the nuclear 
program remains insulated from the creeping influ-
ence of Islamist militants. To prevent unauthorized 
use, Pakistan has instituted a “three-man rule,” which 
requires concurrent approval of three individuals for a 
nuclear launch, all relevant personnel are screened by 
four different agencies, and Islamabad is also working 
towards adapting the US Personnel Reliability and 
Emergency Support Teams (NEST) concept (Zeb 
2007; Lavoy 2007). Pakistan has, with technical 
advice from the United States, also instituted elabo-
rate protocols to ensure physical safety of its sensitive 
sites.  
India’s Missile Capabilities
A nuclear weapon program requires not only the 
production of fissile material and its weaponization, 
but also an effective and credible missile system with 
range, accuracy and survivability. !e evolution of 
India’s missile program is clearly intertwined with 
India’s ambitions to emerge as a nuclear weapons 
state and is therefore guided by strategic ambitions 
and interests. India launched the Integrated Guided 
Missile Development Program (IGMDP) in 1983 
with an initial ten-year budget of $260 million 
to be managed by India’s Defense Research and 
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Development Laboratory (DRDL), which was part of 
the central military research and development facility 
of India, the Defense Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO). Agni and Prithvi formed the 
core families of missiles in the Indian program (Pant 
and Gopalaswamy 2008).
Agni is an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
(IRBM) being developed as a part of the IGMDP. 
!e Agni-I was test fired successfully in May 1989 
using a shortened Prithvi as the second stage (Jane’s 
Defense Weekly 1989). India subsequently conducted 
three tests before halting the program under US pres-
sure. India had then claimed that the Agni was being 
used only as a “technology demonstrator.” However, 
India resumed its program after Pakistan’s test of the 
600 kilometer range HATF-III in 1997.
In April 1999, India tested its Agni-II missile 
over a distance of 1250 kilometers. !e Agni-II is a 
two-stage, nuclear-capable missile with solid rocket 
motors. It incorporated a far more accurate termi-
nal navigation and guidance system that constantly 
updated information about the flight path of the 
missile using Global Positioning System (GPS) satel-
lites and ground-based beacons. It was also reported 
that the missile could be launched in fifteen minutes, 
compared with the day-long preparation required for 
Agni-I. India subsequently tested Agni-II in 2001 
to a distance of 2000 kilometers and then again in 
January 2002 (Federation of American Scientists 
2000).
!e development of Agni-III was started report-
edly around the late 1990s. !e Agni-III was tested 
for the first time in July 2006. !e test failed because 
of a defective heat shield that caused it to crash into 
the Bay of Bengal after traveling 1000 km. However, 
in May 2008, India successfully test fired the 3500 
km range Agni-III missile from Wheeler Island off 
the coast of the Indian state of Orissa. !is was a 
follow-up test to the one a year earlier when India 
had achieved success in test firing Agni-III for the 
first time. !e indigenously developed two-stage, all 
solid fueled, 48 meter-long missile helped India gain 
entry into the exclusive club of half a dozen states 
that can launch IRBMs capable of hitting targets 
3000 to 3500 kilometers away (Mistry 2006).
Prithvi was the first product of the IGMDP and 
it has three versions: Prithvi-I (a battlefield support 
version, 150 km range with a 1000 kg payload), 
Prithvi-II (250 km range with a 500-750 kg payload) 
and Prithvi-III, also known as “Dhanush” (350 km 
range with a 750 kg payload). Prithvi-I and Prithvi-II 
are liquid fueled and single-staged, while Dhanush 
is a two-staged solid fueled missile. While Prithvi-I 
and Prithvi-II are deployed, Prithvi-III is believed 
by defense analysts to be at an advanced stage of 
development. !e development of Prithvi-III began 
in 1994 and the project was rumored to have been 
terminated. However, India conducted two missile 
tests in 2004, quashing those rumors. 
Pakistan’s Missile Capabilities
Pakistan began a military ballistic missile program in 
response to the initiation of India’s IGMDP in 1983. 
Beginning with little aerospace or defense infrastruc-
ture, the Pakistani ballistic missile program has made 
surprisingly rapid progress. !ere are two parallel 
and competing special weapons programs for nuclear 
weapons and missiles: the A. Q. Khan Research Lab-
oratories (KRL) and the National Defense Complex 
(NDC) of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
(PAEC). KRL, which was founded in 1976, focuses 
on two missions: 1) enriching uranium for nuclear 
weapons, and 2) developing liquid-fueled ballistic 
missiles. !e NDC was created in 1993 under the 
PAEC with the objective of developing an infra-
structure for indigenous development, production, 
and integration of solid-fueled missiles, launchers, 
explosive materials, and propellants (Nuclear !reat 
Initiative 2008).
A description of Pakistani missiles is compli-
cated by the practice of using multiple names and/
or re-designating new and existing missiles formerly 
applied to other systems. Some missiles also appear 
to be overlapping in their missions. In any case, more 
than half a dozen types of missiles have been tested 
in the “Hatf” series. Hatf-II, with a range of 70-80 
km and a payload of 500 kg is already inducted 
into the army. An extended version of the Hatf-I 
missile, the “Abdali,” was test-fired in May 2002. 
Pakistan conducted the first test of its liquid fueled 
MRBM Ghauri in April 1998. An improved version 
of the Ghauri missile, with a range of 1500 km, was 
produced subsequently and is now operational with 
the Pakistan Army. In March 2004, the Shaheen-II 
missile with a reported range of 2000 km was test 
fired. Finally, later in the same year Pakistan intro-
duced cruise missiles into the South Asian calculus by 
test-firing “Babur” with a reported range of 700 km 
(Dawn 2007). Pakistan has also conducted success-
ful tests of its solid-fuel Air Launched Cruise Missile 
(ALCM) “Ra’ad” (Express India 2008). 
It is worth mentioning that Pakistan’s missile 
program is believed to have benefited more from 
external assistance than did India’s. Although Pakistan 
denies any link, Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s 
missile program is well established in intellectual 
circles. Experts agree that China and Pakistan began 
a partnership in various defense programs in the late 
1960s. !eir relationship grew out of their mutual 
need in countering the Soviet and Indian threats 
and continued through the cold war period. Even 
post-Cold War, Chinese support to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program, and specifically the missile program, is 
believed to have continued. Moreover, Pakistan is 
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also believed to have received liquid fueled missile 
technology from North Korea (Wright 1998).
Given the relative weakness of Pakistan’s air force 
compared to India’s, Pakistan is likely to employ 
missiles for both nuclear and conventional warheads. 
And given that, like China and India, Pakistan’s mis-
siles are mobile, they have added survivability and 
are thus attractive as the primary delivery systems. 
Indeed, it is reasonable to expect Pakistan to bank on 
its ballistic missiles in this role. 
Consequences of Nuclearization
!e “global zero” initiative notwithstanding, India 
and Pakistan stand out as exceptions who are 
continuing to expand their nuclear arsenals. !ose 
who study the region carefully argue that the trend 
is unlikely to reverse any time soon. India formally 
espouses a triad, and along with other high-end tech-
nology such as Ballistic Missile Defense, is working 
towards achieving that end. Pakistan’s quest to 
maintain a credible deterrent against India is nudging 
it to increase its own fissile material, stockpile size, 
and missile capability. All this adds to the existing 
concerns linked to the South Asian nuclear equation. 
While positive aspects such as a survivable nuclear 
capability for both sides, credibility of the deterrent, 
the virtual impossibility of successful preemption, 
and de-mated and low-alert postures are not inconse-
quential, we focus on the principal areas of concern 
below which are somehow different than what the 
Cold War rivals faced and more importantly, where 
the international community can play a direct role in 
mitigating the risks.  
 
ǰF1PUFOUJBMGPS$POnJDUtPakistan and India are 
the only two nuclear-armed states where outstanding 
disputes remain active. Glenn Snyder’s “stability-
instability paradox” plays out very clearly in the 
South Asian context with the two sides viewing 
limited wars as permissible (Snyder 1965; Krepon 
and Gagne 2001). Pakistan was guilty of testing 
India’s red lines in 1999 when it infiltrated into 
Indian Kashmir and fought a low intensity conflict 
at Kargil. After another near-war crisis in 2001-2, 
India developed a Pakistan-specific war fighting 
doctrine—the “Cold Start”—designed specifically to 
attack Pakistan surgically without crossing its nuclear 
threshold (Ladwig 2007-08). With such limited war 
doctrines in place and with no previous experience 
at managing escalation beyond the lowest rung, 
the equilibrium is a tenuous one to say the least. 
Furthermore, India’s growing conventional advantage 
over Pakistan will force the latter to bank even more 
heavily on its nuclear deterrent in the times ahead. 
Likewise, high-end Indian acquisitions like Ballistic 
Missile Defense will push Pakistan to augment its 
offensive capabilities needlessly and may unleash a 
fresh arms race dynamic. 
Moreover, irrelevant to the Cold War, the Indo-
Pak nuclear relationship is marked by the presence 
of, and heightened by international concerns about, 
non-state militant actors, particularly in Pakistan. 
Having been used by Pakistan as a foreign policy tool 
to force a change in the status quo in Kashmir during 
the 1990s, anti-India militant groups have become 
increasingly independent of the Pakistani intelligence 
agencies and now present a ticking time bomb when 
it comes to their potential to attack India from Paki-
stani soil and trigger an all-out conflict. !ey almost 
did so when they attacked the Indian parliament in 
December 2001 and the city of Mumbai in Novem-
ber 2008. Pakistan has pledged inability to fully 
control them and Indian patience is already severely 
tested. Should a repeat occur, India may well respond 
through force, which is certain to elicit a response 
in kind from Pakistan and consequently unleash the 
dreaded escalatory dynamic.
 
-FWFMPG*OTUJUVUJPOBM$POUSPMt Decisions regarding 
nuclear weapons control have featured prominently 
in the proliferation debate over the years. During the 
Cold War, the Russians and Americans each devel-
oped an “assertive” command and control system 
with high-level civilian control, which is believed to 
be a prerequisite for stable deterrence. In the South 
Asian context, although the Indians have an assertive 
civilian control of the military with very little direct 
military influence on any aspect of nuclear weapons 
policy, Pakistan has been at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. !e military has had the upper hand with 
only marginal influence from civilian political leaders, 
even during periods of civilian leadership in Islam-
abad. Although the NCA has the Prime Minister as 
the final authority, the civil-military relationship is so 
anomalous that the military may ultimately trump 
the politicians in any eventuality. Just how hegemonic 
the military’s control really is over the final, dreaded 
decision to employ nuclear weapons will never be 
clear, however, as the Pakistani strategic planners have 
an incentive to insist publicly that civilians control 
the program, while also leaving views suggesting that 
the military is fully in charge unchallenged. Perverse 
as it is, true or not, the view that a belligerent Paki-
stani military calls the shots on nuclear weapons adds 
to the deterrent effect vis-à-vis India. 
 
(FPHSBQIJDBM1SPYJNJUZBOE4IBSFE)FSJUBHFt As 
Scott D. Sagan explains, the United States and the 
Soviet Union were on completely different ends of 
the globe, had primarily an ideological rivalry, and 
viewed each other as mysterious due to factors such 
as their disparate histories, languages, and cultures. 
An important consideration is that they did not share 
any disputed territory (Sagan 2001). In contrast, 
India and Pakistan are geographically contiguous and 
share a common colonial and pre-colonial history, as 
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well as a common culture and heritage. Contiguity 
implies that unlike the Cold War, missile flights and 
reaction times are extremely short, leaving virtually 
no margin of error. Moreover, with dual-use missiles 
whose employment strategies are not always clear, 
either side can mistake an incoming battery for a 
nuclear launch and respond in kind prematurely. 
Contiguity also implies that once nuclear weapons 
are mated and actively deployed, there is a high 
incentive to disperse and pre-delegate launch author-
ity, especially for Pakistan. In that sense, Islamabad 
is likely to err on the “always” side of Peter Feaver’s 
“always-never dilemma;” this is known to be an insta-
bility inducing factor (Feaver 1992-93).
Oddly enough, the shared heritage plays out nega-
tively as well, as it instills a false sense of understand-
ing of the “other’s” thought and decision making 
process. !e fact is that the two sides have moved 
along very different institutional paths and their 
deliberate policy to keep their people apart has meant 
that they know little about what goes on across the 
border. Misperceptions about each other and their 
decision making are rife. In fact, during crises they 
have tended to suspend all direct communication and 
channel signals through third parties, which adds to 
the potential for belligerence. 
 
-FWFMPG5FDIOPMPHJDBM$POUSPMt India and Pakistan 
are relative newcomers to the problems associated 
with owning nuclear weapons. !e nearly sixty years 
of US nuclear weapons management has demon-
strated that this is a dangerous game. !ere have 
been a number of accidents that have strained the 
safety features on US nuclear weapons, and pushed 
the US command and control system to the limit. 
Realistically, all three nuclear weapons states in 
the region—China, India, and Pakistan—can be 
concerned that the other countries’ nuclear weapons 
are not sufficiently safe to be continuously deployed 
for extended periods of time. !e three states are geo-
graphically too close to each other for early warning 
systems to be meaningful in their war-fighting plans. 
For instance, the time-of-flight of a Scud-type missile 
to fly the approximately 700 kilometers between 
Delhi and Islamabad is around six minutes. !is is 
just about the time the Pentagon’s threat assessment 
conferences took during the false alarms of 1979 
(“training tape incident”) and 1980 (“computer chip 
incident”) (Forden, Podvig, and Postol 2000). In 
fact, real-time early warning might prove destabiliz-
ing. !is is because if any of these countries decided 
to adopt a policy of launching its weapons on the 
warning of an attack, it would not give the other 
side enough time to properly evaluate, consider, and 
eliminate the inevitable false alarms. !is is much 
different than the Cold War context where early 
warning satellites could be credited for preventing 
nuclear annihilation on more than one occasion.
 
.PSUHBHFE$SJTJT.BOBHFNFOUt !e Cold War 
was a superpower rivalry where no third power was 
strong enough to intervene or weigh in on a crisis 
between them. With India and Pakistan, the situa-
tion is much different. !ey not only are influenced 
by outside actors, but in fact have actively sought 
outside assistance in crisis situations to solicit an 
outcome in their favor. Since the advent of nuclear 
weapons, every crisis has seen the two sides reach out 
to the United States, which has been instrumental 
in nudging them to back down. !is happened at 
Kargil in 1999, during the 2001-2 crisis, and during 
the post-Mumbai crisis in 2008. !e situation is a 
highly destabilizing one as it effectively implies that 
crisis management in South Asia has been contracted 
out to the United States. While the United States 
has commendably resisted the temptation to support 
either party decisively, instead acting as a neutral 
“pivot” and ultimately successfully balancing between 
the two sides to ensure détente, there is no guaran-
tee that it will be able to do so in the future (Yusuf 
2010). !is is both because, unlike the past, US 
interests or the international environment may not 
allow the United States to remain totally neutral; or 
because India or Pakistan may act before Washington 
has time to use its diplomatic offices. India’s Cold 
Start makes this latter scenario a realistic possibility, 
whereby India may decide to punish Pakistan before 
the United States can impress upon it to exercise 
restraint. Regardless, the very fact that manage-
ment of a crisis is to be conducted at the behest of 
an outside party in the absence of any direct, robust 
bilateral crisis management mechanism between 
India and Pakistan is highly destabilizing. 
 
%JTDSJNJOBUPSZ(MPCBM3FHJNFt!e international 
community must accept its share of the blame for 
intensifying the nuclear rivalry between India and 
Pakistan. !e nuclear world is discriminatory and 
established nuclear states have been insincere towards 
disarmament despite having committed to it in the 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).2 !is has allowed 
India and Pakistan to deflect international pressure 
with ease; both continue to point to others to justify 
their reluctance to rethink their nuclear capabilities. 
!e two South Asian nuclear powers remain outside 
the global non-proliferation ambit and none of the 
major treaties apply to them. !ey enjoy the military 
and diplomatic benefits of being nuclear states, and 
2  Article VI of the NPT lays down an in principle agree-
ment by the five recognized nuclear weapon states to move 
towards global disarmament. However, they have actively 
deflected the pressure to do so, citing security and technical 
concerns. In fact, the debate has now shifted to restricting 
Article IV rights, under which all NPT members have the 
right to access nuclear energy freely. 
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yet they are not constrained by non-proliferation 
obligations like all other NPT members. 
!e international community has either ignored 
calls to bring them into some sort of legally binding 
nonproliferation arrangement or has ended up 
making exceptions on an individual case-by-case 
basis. !e latter tend to be counterproductive as they 
discriminate against one or the other party. !e most 
recent example is the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, 
whose India-specific exceptions have antagonized 
Pakistan and prompted it to seek similar arrange-
ments for itself (Hibbs 2010). A broader domino 
effect is a realistic possibility as well. 
!e Way Ahead for the 
International Community
Structural realities, human error, misperception or 
selective perception, faulty analogies, and miscalcula-
tion could combine in a number of ways to under-
mine the ragged strategic stability that exists in South 
Asia. !e international community must work along-
side India and Pakistan towards crisis prevention and 
stability. While a proactive role may be unwelcome, 
the United States and other friendly countries must 
continue to nudge both sides to resolve their out-
standing differences. !e combination of unresolved 
core issues and growing nuclear arsenals makes for a 
rather somber projection. Meanwhile, the interna-
tional community must also use diplomatic leverage 
to convince India and Pakistan to give up on limited 
war designs. !is also requires that Pakistan do its 
utmost to tame anti-India militant outfits on its terri-
tory in the first place. 
Globally, key players on the nuclear scene must 
craft a strategy to pull India and Pakistan into the 
global non-proliferation regime. !e nature of the 
regime necessitates an exception to nuclear states 
outside the system, but this is worthwhile if these two 
sides are to be assured of acceptance of their nuclear 
programs and brought to the table for serious nego-
tiations on arms control and disarmament.
Another issue that is worth serious consideration 
is the level of technological control, in particular 
the early warning system. New nuclear states often 
run a substantial risk that their nuclear weapons 
may accidentally explode, perhaps triggering an 
inadvertent nuclear war. In that case, joint centers—
supplying information from the sensors not involved 
in the conflict—might prevent a tragic accident from 
escalating to a regional nuclear war (Forden 2006). 
Established nuclear weapon states could assist in this 
regard. !e United States could potentially help in 
providing intelligence and warning information, on 
a case-by-case basis, in peacetime and during crises 
to reduce the danger of false alarms. In addition, 
safer management of nuclear weapons operations 
can be encouraged through discussion with other 
nuclear states of organizational “best practices” in 
the area of nuclear weapons security and safety. !e 
United States has already shared best practices with 
Pakistan and provided technical assistance to avoid 
accidental or inadvertent use, as well as knowledge 
regarding physically securing facilities and ensuring 
personnel reliability. Such cooperation could also be 
provided to India without treading upon sensitivities 
regarding intrusion into the program. At no cost, 
however, should the United States present itself as a 
keen mediator in crises such that India and Pakistan 
see US diplomatic persuasion to limit escalation as a 
substitute for direct bilateral crisis management tools. 
Indians and Pakistanis must acknowledge their 
responsibilities as states possessing nuclear weapons, 
and the United States must acknowledge their right 
to seek assistance in terms of technology, political 
will, and the diplomatic push. Assistance from the 
United States and other countries in providing the 
concepts and arms verification technology could 
enable potential bilateral and multilateral agreements.
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Pakistan’s Nukes: How Safe is 
Safe Enough?
BY RIZWAN ZEB
The safety and security of nuclear weapons, mate-
rial, and related data is a subject of great worry for 
all concerned with international security. Since the 
“global war on terrorism” began in 2001, Pakistan 
has been criticized often as a country with inadequate 
security for its nuclear installations, technology, and 
know-how. !e reports of an August 2001 meeting 
between former engineers of the Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC), Sultan Bashiruddin 
Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, and Osama 
bin Laden added to this alarm. However, it is not 
clear what assistance Mahmood and Majeed could 
have provided, considering their lack of expertise on 
the weaponization side. !e notorious A.Q. Khan 
network that was involved in global nuclear pro-
liferation and allegedly supplied parts and plans to 
countries such as Libya, North Korea, and Iran is also 
reputed to have been a possible supplier to Al Qaeda, 
although no substantial proof of this connection has 
been made available. After an extensive investiga-
tion, Islamabad claimed that A.Q. Khan’s activities 
constituted a rogue operation by Dr. Khan motivated 
by greed. In February 2004, Khan accepted respon-
sibility for his actions on national television, after 
which he was pardoned by then President Pervez 
Musharraf but placed under house arrest. In 2008 
Khan recanted his confession. Following a period of 
five years of house arrest, an Islamabad High Court 
ruling freed Khan in February 2009. !e Pakistani 
government has resisted requests from the United 
States and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
to question Dr. Khan about his alleged involvement 
in black market nuclear trade, and undoubtedly will 
never grant such access.
Despite these high-profile episodes, Islamabad 
avers that it has foolproof security for its nuclear 
installations. Yet many in the country and abroad 
believe that Pakistani nuclear facilities—especially 
civilian ones—are not secure enough. !ey fear these 
installations can be attacked by terrorists and are 
susceptible to an insider or insider-outsider threat. A 
prominent national daily in its editorial pointed out 
some time ago: “Islamabad claims that it has a fail-
safe system of safety for its nuclear facilities, but any 
known estimates of how a state may achieve complete 
security of nuclear materials militate against such a 
claim.” !is opinion might carry some weight, but is 
it specific to Pakistan only? 
Security Breaches in Established 
Nuclear Weapons States
To provide some broader context regarding concerns 
over nuclear safety and security in Pakistan, it is 
instructive to look at the recent track record in this 
regard of established nuclear powers—formally recog-
nized nuclear weapons states as per the terms of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). !e follow-
ing sampling of security incidents relevant to control 
and accounting of nuclear technology, materials, and 
information in the United States, Russia, and other 
countries might suffice to demonstrate that placing 
a disproportionate emphasis on Pakistan as a nuclear 
security scapegoat is arguably unfair. !e incidents 
described below suggest there is ample justification to 
expand the discussion considerably to include other 
global actors.
On August 29, 2007, an American B-52 bomber 
took off from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota 
and later landed at Barksdale Air Force Base in 
Louisiana with six live nuclear weapons onboard. An 
investigation conducted subsequent to this incident 
found that observance of security precautions and 
handling procedures had become so bad that these 
nuclear weapons were stored alongside conventional 
missiles and that the U.S. Air Force staff at the base 
were not even able to differentiate between the two. 
However, according to observers, the most worrisome 
point is that six nuclear weapons went missing for 
almost 36 hours and no one noticed.
In spring 2008, a group of terrorists were able 
to enter the Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory (LLNL), a U.S. nuclear research complex that 
includes a building housing some 2,000 pounds 
of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium. !e 
Lab security failed miserably. Luckily for them it 
happened during an exercise. !e objective of the 
exercise was that after reaching their target, the “ter-
rorist” team was to try to hold on for enough time 
to build a dirty bomb, put together a simple nuclear 
device, or escape with fissile material. !e security 
failure happened despite advance notice and the fact 
that this exercise lacked potential key aspects of a 
real attack, such as the initial shock or hostage taking 
(Zagorin 2008).
Since 2001, there have been at least seven occur-
rences of information security lapses at the U.S. Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, the birthplace of the 
atom bomb. According to publicly available details, 
classified computer disks have been misplaced, and 
classified information has been transmitted through 
insecure e-mails from the laboratory. In one incident, 
two hard drives containing highly classified, SIGMA-
14 Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) data 
went missing. !ese hard drives were later found 
“with all the fingerprints wiped away” behind a Xerox 
photocopier machine.
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 In August 2007, six Ameri-
can nuclear weapons went 
missing for almost 36 hours 
and no U.S. Air Force staff 
members noticed.
 A 2006 U.S. National 
Intelligence Council report 
cites four known incidents 
since 1992 in which sizable 
amounts of weapons-grade 
or weapons-usable highly 
enriched uranium were 
stolen from Russian nuclear 
facilities.
In an earlier incident at Los Alamos, Dr. Wen 
Ho Lee, a scientist at the lab, was fired and arrested 
for “jeopardizing virtually every nuclear warhead 
arsenal through unauthorized computer transfers of 
the country’s most sensitive nuclear secrets” in 1999. 
He copied thousands of pages of sensitive docu-
ments in 1993, 1994 and 1997. According to one 
report in 1997, he copied a complete source code for 
the current version of the most advanced primary 
weapon design. !is event was one of the main 
reasons behind the creation of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) to improve the 
security of the American nuclear complex.
In another event which surfaced in October 2006, 
Jessica Quitana, a clerk at Los Alamos, managed to 
take home 228 pages of hard copies printed on both 
sides and 408 separated documents in three flash 
drives, without authorization and without anybody 
checking her. According to one media report, 
although the information was not top secret it was 
sensitive and mostly classified. !e point is not what 
she took; the point is the ease with which she was 
able to do so. Ironically, this breach was discovered 
only due to a police raid of the trailer home she 
shared with an admitted drug dealer (Zagorin 2007). 
One wonders how many other such security breaches 
have taken place, and of which nobody is aware or 
which have been covered up (as it has been reported 
that the NNSA tried to keep this incident secret from 
the Congress and the American people).
!e situation in Russia is hardly more reassur-
ing. Russia maintains an estimated 12,000 nuclear 
warheads, including roughly 2,600 strategic warheads 
and 2,000 nonstrategic warheads in its operational 
arsenal, plus some 7,300 warheads in reserve or 
awaiting dismantlement (Norris and Christensen 
2010). Yet, the country’s nuclear materials protection, 
control, and accounting remain deeply problematic. 
!e possibility of terrorist attacks or security breaches 
perpetrated by insiders both rank high on the list of 
concerns relevant to Russia’s nuclear arsenal, given the 
deteriorated conditions of the technical and person-
nel infrastructure within the country’s military-indus-
trial complex. A 2006 U.S. National Intelligence 
Council report cites four known incidents since 
1992 in which sizable amounts of weapons-grade or 
weapons-usable highly enriched uranium were stolen 
from Russian nuclear facilities, but in these cases the 
thefts were later detected. !e report further asserts, 
however, that “undetected smuggling of weapons-
usable nuclear materials has likely occurred,” and that 
concerns exist regarding the total amount of material 
that could have been diverted or stolen since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (National Intelligence 
Council 2006). Meanwhile, the United States has 
invested billions of dollars over the past two decades 
in working cooperatively with Russia to reduce 
threats to the safety and security of the latter’s nuclear 
arsenal—a testament to the attention given by 
both countries to nuclear security issues but also an 
acknowledgment of the seriousness of the situation.
Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities are worthy of 
safety and security scrutiny, as well. Russia’s nuclear 
regulatory body, Rostekhnadzor, has warned of 
potential problems as a result of the country’s eco-
nomic crisis corresponding to the global financial 
meltdown and the fall in natural gas and oil prices. 
Included in the report’s list of areas for concern is the 
potential for nuclear scientists and technical special-
ists—newly unemployed due to staff cuts resulting 
from the economic decline—to sell their expertise 
and services. !e report cites not only potential for 
overall erosion of safety due to the economic crisis, 
but references the prospects for depleted funding 
and infrastructure assigned to materials control and 
accounting and physical protection (Environment 
News Service 2008).
!e central point here is that long-established 
nuclear weapons states have experienced significant 
episodes of proliferation risk and nuclear security 
breaches, and likely will continue to do so. One 
can also note the transnational nature of the threat: 
witness the made-for-Hollywood incident from 2006, 
in which the British authorities claim that a Russian 
spy, Andrei Lugovoi, came to London on a British 
Airways flight, landed at Heathrow, went through 
customs and immigration, killed former KGB 
agent Alexander Litvinenko with a highly toxic and 
radioactive material (polonium-210) by poisoning 
him, then returned to Moscow—without anyone at 
any stage able to detect the radioactive material until 
after the crime was completed. !e fact that such 
material evidently can be smuggled across borders or 
through airport checkpoints in developed, nuclear 
weapons countries suggests that problems in manag-
ing nuclear or radiological material extend far beyond 
just Pakistan.
Pakistan under the Microscope: 
What Are the Risks?
A number of analysts believe that Al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist organizations are working to acquire nuclear 
weapons, which could be used against the United 
States and other Western countries. !ese analysts 
tend to view South Asia as the likeliest possible place 
from where these terrorists can get or steal a nuclear 
weapon or material. !is view is based on the fact 
that despite the on-going peace process between the 
two nuclear states of India and Pakistan, South Asia 
is unstable and suffers from a number of internal and 
regional security problems.
For its part, India has a history of thefts and 
accidents related to nuclear and radioactive materials 
or equipment. Incidents include over eight kilograms 
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of uranium stolen from the Indira Gandhi Centre for 
Atomic Research in 1998, and thefts of radioactive 
materials from hospitals and industry sources, such as 
steel plants and uranium mines (Basrur and Stein-
häusler 2004). India has also been identified, along 
with several other South, Southeastern, and Central 
Asian states, as a significant site for the smuggling 
and trafficking of materials needed to make nuclear 
or radiological weapons. As with other countries, the 
“success” stories—incidents where theft or trafficking 
has been detected by authorities—may in fact serve 
to underscore the notion that there are still more 
examples of undetected nuclear theft and smuggling 
(Prosser 2004). Despite such concerns, India has “so 
far rejected offers of nuclear security cooperation” 
from international partners such as the United States 
(Bunn and Newman 2008).
However, Pakistan remains the main focus of 
nuclear security anxieties among the international 
media, scholars, and analysts. Since the war against 
terror began, a number of observers and experts have 
raised concerns about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons, fissile material stocks, and nuclear facili-
ties. A recent study by Matthew Bunn of Harvard 
University’s Managing the Atom Project asserts 
that Pakistan’s stockpile “faces a greater threat from 
Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than 
any other nuclear stockpile on earth” (Bunn 2010). 
Graham Allison, director of Harvard’s Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, characterizes the 
threat as follows: “!e assassination of former Paki-
stani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto [in December 
2007] reminds us starkly of an unanswered ques-
tion most of us would prefer to forget: how secure 
are Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? Could Al Qaeda or 
another terrorist group acquire a warhead or enough 
radioactive material to create a dirty bomb?” Refer-
encing multiple near-miss assassination attempts on 
Pakistan’s then-President Pervez Musharraf, Allison 
asked how plausible it is that the country’s nuclear 
arsenal is more secure than the president of the 
country himself. Allison further suggested that “the 
design of Pakistan’s nuclear control system creates 
risks of insider theft” (Allison 2007).
According to David Albright, noted nuclear 
proliferation analyst and President of the Institute for 
Science and International Security, Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons are not thought to be “one-point safe” or 
equipped with permissive action links (PALs), at least 
as defined by the United States. He has identified 
a spectrum of threats to Pakistani nuclear weapons 
and installations. Security breach scenarios include 
outsider, insider, and insider/outsider threats—where, 
respectively, armed individuals or groups from 
outside a facility, individuals who work at a facility, 
or both types working together gain access to and 
remove fissile material, weapons, or weapons compo-
nents. At the most extreme end of Albright’s threat 
categorizations are scenarios resulting from major 
instability or civil war: loss of central control of storage 
facilities or a coup—with either the existing Pakistani 
government losing clear lines of communication and 
control over nuclear facilities in the former case, or a 
new regime attempting to gain control of the nuclear 
complex in the latter (Albright 2001).
Zafar Ali of the Pakistani Army’s Strategic Plans 
Division has outlined American concerns regarding 
Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and materials similar to 
those described above. He further adds that some 
analysts have expressed worries about the vulnerabil-
ity of the country’s nuclear weapons during war time, 
movement, and deployment; and that security breach 
scenarios could lead not simply to theft of materials 
or loss of control of facilities, but in the worst case 
even an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear 
weapons (Ali 2007). 
Given the difficulties that any state faces in 
ensuring complete security over its nuclear weapons, 
materials, and sensitive data—as demonstrated in 
the above discussion of US and Russian security 
breaches—the fears about Pakistan carry some 
weight. However, one might identify at least some 
parallel concerns in all other nuclear weapons states, 
as extremism and criminal activity exist in every 
country. Moreover, there is another side to the story 
about Pakistan, which might serve to moderate the 
alarmism that prevails in the Western media. Namely, 
what measures has Pakistan taken to establish a reli-
able command and control regime over its nuclear 
weapons and installations? 
Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan
Islamabad has taken a number of steps over the years 
to ensure the safety and security of its civilian nuclear 
facilities and assets and its military nuclear installa-
tions, nuclear weapons, and fissile material stocks. 
First, Pakistan has participated in international 
nuclear safety and security programs. It acceded to 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (CPPNM), ratifying the 1979 CPPNM on 
September 4, 2000. It is a party to the 1986 Conven-
tion on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
and Nuclear Safety, having acceded on September 
11, 1989. Pakistan also is a signatory to the 1994 
International Convention on Nuclear Safety, having 
formalized its ratification on September 30, 1997. 
!is cooperation with international regimes is 
reflected in the steps Pakistan has taken domesti-
cally to manage its civilian nuclear industry. !e 
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) 
was established in 2001 by government ordinance, 
to ensure and enhance safety, security, and account-
ability of all Pakistani nuclear facilities. !e PNRA 
has been entrusted with the control, regulation and 
supervision of all matters related to nuclear safety and 
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radiation protection measures in Pakistan, and works 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Pakistan has likewise developed a robust 
command and control system over its nuclear 
weapons complex. On February 2, 2000, the coun-
try’s National Security Council approved the creation 
of the National Command Authority (NCA). !e 
NCA is responsible for nuclear strategic policy 
formulation and exercises control over the employ-
ment and development of all strategic nuclear forces 
and strategic organizations. !e NCA is comprised 
of the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and 
the Development Control Committee (DCC), as 
well as the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which acts 
as Secretariat. !e Employment Control Commit-
tee, chaired by the head of the government—the 
prime minister of Pakistan—includes the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs (Deputy Chairman), Defence, and 
Interior; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Committee (CJCSC) and the Services Chiefs; and 
the Director General of the Strategic Plans Division, 
who is also the secretary of this committee. Techni-
cal advisers and others can attend if and when asked 
and/or required by the Chairman. !e main duty of 
this committee is to formulate the country’s nuclear 
strategy, including the targeting policy. !e head 
of the government is also the chair of the Develop-
ment Control Committee, which is responsible for 
the development of strategic assets. !is committee 
includes the Chairman of the JCSC, who acts as 
Deputy Chairman; the three Services Chiefs; the 
Director General of the Strategic Plans Division; and 
the heads of concerned strategic organizations as and 
when required. !e Strategic Plans Division is cur-
rently headed by Lt. General (Retd.) Khalid Ahmed 
Kidwai. !e primary duty of the SPD is the planning 
and coordination of the establishment of a reliable 
command, control, communication, computers and 
intelligence (C4I) network for the NCA.
In a lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in October 2006, Kidwai acknowledged some 
of the fears of the international community and 
media about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. However, he 
attributed those anxieties largely to the general lack 
of information about the country’s command and 
control structure, and noted a “snowballing effect” 
from insufficient communications (presumably by 
state officials) that has led to some misconceptions. 
He pointed generally to the programs developed 
by the NCA and PNRA to improve safety, security, 
and accountability. Kidwai also attempted to ease 
concerns about unauthorized use of Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons, explaining that “Pakistani nuclear controls 
include some functional equivalent to the two-man 
rule and permissive action links (PALs) that the 
United States and some other nuclear weapons states 
rely on to protect against loss of control, inadvertent 
weapons use, accidents, and other mishaps” (Walker 
2006). In addition to such procedural and technical 
measures, Pakistan has also established a very rigorous 
selection process for personnel working on nuclear 
duties. According to available details, the process is 
close to the American Personnel Reliability Program 
(PRP). All employees and their families are vetted, 
and this process is repeated every two years or when 
the staff member is transferred.
In short, while the threats to the security of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, technology, and materials 
have been cited repeatedly—particularly since 9/11 
and exposure of the A.Q. Khan network—Pakistan’s 
progress in enhancing its infrastructure to protect 
the country’s nuclear assets generally receives little 
attention. Likewise, although Pakistan remains a non-
signatory to the NPT—primarily due to its security 
and deterrence imperatives with respect to India 
rather than a desire to buck international norms, state 
officials would contend—it has actively engaged with 
the international community on a series of nuclear 
security and safety agreements and their correspond-
ing requirements. Meanwhile, Pakistan has also taken 
steps to regulate and further professionalize both its 
civilian and military nuclear installations and person-
nel. !ese facts tend to get lost amidst the media 
echo chamber’s fixation with Pakistani “loose nukes” 
scenarios.
!e Importance of a Balanced 
and Earnest Perspective
One can make the case that Pakistan is the most 
misunderstood and misinterpreted country in the 
world. Pakistan is portrayed as a country on the 
verge of collapse, of being taken over by jihadists, 
or of standing by while rogue elements of its army 
seize—and use—its nuclear weapons. !ese are 
overly sensationalistic impressions that ignore signifi-
cant contravening realities, namely: that a popular 
movement managed to steer the country away from 
military dictatorship and back towards a civilian-led, 
secular parliamentary democracy, with free and fair 
elections in 2008 in which Islamist parties garnered 
less than 3% of the vote; that the Pakistani govern-
ment has taken the toughest possible police and 
military actions in recent years against extremists in 
Swat Valley, South Waziristan, and other parts of the 
country’s Northwest Frontier Province and Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as wherever 
extremists may operate in Pakistan’s urban centers; 
and that the Pakistani army ranks among the most 
disciplined and well trained armed forces in the 
world. So Anatol Lieven is correct when he argues, 
“While they [jihadists] can attack the state they 
cannot overthrow it” (Lieven 2008).
With respect to nuclear security, it is about time 
that the American policy makers and analysts focused 
on what is happening right under their noses before 
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criticizing others for not doing enough. Pakistan 
is working diligently to secure its nuclear complex, 
not simply because the United States and the West 
want such measures, but because of its own sense of 
responsibility. Islamabad was brave enough to accept 
and correct the illegal practices of a few persons. 
Since the creation of the NCA, not a single security 
lapse or breach has been reported with respect to 
Pakistan’s nuclear installations, although Pakistan 
is a new entrant in the nuclear field and its security 
mechanism is still evolving. !is is not to say that 
nothing further can be done to strengthen the secu-
rity of the Pakistani nuclear complex, nor that there 
are no threats or problems. However, it is clear that 
Pakistani officials realize the necessity to secure the 
country’s nuclear assets, and every possible effort is 
being made in this regard. 
It is imperative that instead of criticizing each 
other, all nuclear states and nuclear-capable states 
should work together to ensure that nuclear weapons, 
materials and related data are safe and cannot be 
stolen or utilized by terrorists. !is is a shared respon-
sibility of all countries. !e recent reports of security 
incidents particularly in the United States indicate 
that even the security of the American nuclear 
complex is not foolproof. What has been happen-
ing in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex over the 
years makes one wonder how safe and secure its own 
nuclear materials really are, and invites criticism of 
hypocritical treatment towards Pakistan. To para-
phrase Oscar Wilde, losing sensitive nuclear weapons 
materials and information once may be regarded as 
a misfortune, but losing them repeatedly looks like 
carelessness. 
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!e Strategic, Economic, and 
Environmental Implications of 
the US-India Nuclear Agreement
by  DINSHAW MISTRY
In July 2005, in a joint statement with Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh, President George Bush 
committed to attaining civilian nuclear energy coop-
eration with India. !ree years later, after protracted 
negotiations—between Washington and New Delhi, 
and between their governments and domestic oppo-
nents of the nuclear accord—India was finally able 
to import civilian nuclear technology. In September–
October 2008, the US Congress and the interna-
tional Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) lifted their 
longstanding embargo on civilian nuclear trade with 
India. India could thereafter acquire nuclear reactors, 
as well as uranium fuel for its reactors, from foreign 
suppliers. In return, India’s government agreed to 
separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and 
place the civilian component under international 
safeguards. It would place 14 of its 22 power reactors 
(i.e. its 18 heavy water reactors, two US-supplied 
boiling water reactors, and two Russian-built light 
water reactors) under permanent safeguards. It would 
keep its breeder reactor outside safeguards. And it 
would shut down one of its two military-related reac-
tors. Further, India’s government agreed to maintain 
a moratorium on nuclear testing, support talks on 
the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and adhere to 
international guidelines on nuclear and missile export 
controls.
What are the strategic and economic conse-
quences of the nuclear agreement with India? On 
strategic grounds, the nuclear agreement could have 
both negative and positive implications for the non-
proliferation regime. It could also strengthen political 
ties between Washington and New Delhi, and boost 
the strategic partnership between both countries. On 
economic and environmental grounds, the agree-
ment can be beneficial by providing India’s economy 
with a clean source of energy. Still, the magnitude of 
the strategic and economic gains from the nuclear 
agreement remains unclear, and would depend on 
prevailing political and economic factors.
Undermining the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime
Halting the spread of nuclear weapons through a 
strong nuclear nonproliferation regime is a major 
priority on the international security agenda. !e 
nuclear agreement with India has two potentially 
negative implications for the nonproliferation regime.
First, the agreement granted India an exemption 
from a very important NSG rule and US law, which 
forbids the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to 
any state that has not acceded to the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty (NPT) and accepted full-scope 
safeguards. A serious concern with this exemption, 
as the New York Times noted on April 7, 2006, is 
that “in trying to give India a special exemption, Mr. 
Bush is threatening a carrot-and-stick approach that 
has been effective for more than 35 years.” For some 
thirty years, countries could receive civilian nuclear 
technology (the carrot) if they joined the NPT and 
renounced nuclear weapons, but were denied this 
technology (the stick) if they were not in the treaty, 
and India is being given an exemption from this 
approach. If the other two countries that have not 
joined the NPT—Pakistan and Israel—also seek and 
are given an exemption, then the full-scope safeguard 
rule would be relaxed not just for one country (India) 
but for three (Israel, Pakistan, and India). It would 
then be harder to reject exemptions for additional 
countries in Asia or Europe or the Middle East if they 
leave the NPT.
In particular, if a country relies significantly on 
nuclear energy, and on foreign imports of reactors 
and fuel, then it is less likely to break out of the NPT 
if doing so disrupts its energy supplies—which would 
happen under the current rules of the NSG. Yet if 
leaving the NPT does not affect its nuclear energy 
imports (because it is receiving an exemption from 
NSG rules), the country would be more inclined to 
leave the NPT. !us, the exemption for India can 
influence decisions about leaving the NPT in other 
countries, and this would seriously undermine the 
NPT.
!e consequences of the exemption for India may 
well depend on how it is framed. If the exemption 
emphasizes that countries may only be exempt from 
the full-scope safeguards rule after being subject to 
this rule for some twenty to thirty years (as is the 
case with India)—and only if they adhere with major 
nonproliferation rules—the damage to the nonprolif-
eration regime may be lessened. In this case, the car-
rot-and-stick NPT approach would still be affirmed, 
because India incurred important costs (of being 
denied civilian nuclear imports for three decades) 
before receiving an exemption. Further, it only 
received an exemption because of its relatively clean 
export control record (it had not exported sensitive 
nuclear and missile technology to other countries), 
and it will presumably only continue to receive this 
exception as long as it complies with nonproliferation 
norms against nuclear testing.
A Regional Arms Race
A second potentially negative implication of the 
nuclear agreement with India is that it could enable 
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India to expand its nuclear arsenal, leading Pakistan, 
and presumably China, to also expand their arsenals. 
India’s military-related Dhruva reactor—which will 
not be safeguarded under the nuclear agreement—
has been producing, and will continue to produce, 
plutonium sufficient for five nuclear weapons annu-
ally. India could further expand its nuclear weapons 
stockpile in two ways. First, because India’s breeder 
reactor would not be under international safeguards, 
India could use weapons-grade plutonium from this 
reactor to expand its nuclear arsenal. A few years 
after it is operational—say around 2014—there are 
concerns that this reactor would produce plutonium 
sufficient for a few tens of nuclear weapons annu-
ally. Still, only about one-fourth to one-third of this 
plutonium would be weapons-grade, the remainder 
would be reactor-grade material. Further, India may 
require all of the breeder-derived plutonium to fuel 
future breeder reactors. India’s Department of Atomic 
Energy (DAE) plans to build three to four addi-
tional breeder reactors by around 2020. Much of the 
plutonium produced from India’s first breeder reactor 
would then be used to fuel these future breeder reac-
tors, because DAE does not have sufficient pluto-
nium reserves to otherwise fuel these future reactors.
Second, foreign uranium fuel for India’s civilian 
nuclear reactors could theoretically free up India’s 
scarce domestic uranium supplies for use in mili-
tary nuclear reactors. Because eight of India’s power 
reactors will be outside safeguards, India could 
use imported uranium to fully fuel its safeguarded 
reactors, and could use its scarce domestic uranium 
supplies for its unsafeguarded reactors, which could 
in turn produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. 
!is concern may not materialize because India’s 
heavy water reactors produce reactor-grade rather 
than weapons-grade plutonium when operated in a 
normal mode. However, if operated in a low burn up 
mode, these reactors would produce weapons-grade 
plutonium. !us, India could operate a single 220 
megawatt heavy water reactor in a low burn up mode, 
whereby it would consume a considerable 190 tons 
of uranium annually, and could produce 150–200 kg 
of weapons-grade plutonium, sufficient for perhaps 
twenty nuclear weapons annually.
!e concerns about India’s using unsafeguarded 
power reactors and breeder-derived plutonium for 
nuclear weapons can be addressed in two ways. First, 
they could be addressed by a Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty or a global moratorium on fissile material 
production. Once such a treaty is in place and India 
signs it, then India would not be able to use pluto-
nium from any of its reactors for nuclear weapons. 
Second, India may soon have enough nuclear 
material for a minimum deterrent. In theory, some 
100–150 deliverable nuclear weapons would provide 
India with a minimum deterrent against China 
and Pakistan—and India’s existing military reactors 
may already have produced, or could soon produce, 
plutonium sufficient for 100–150 nuclear weapons. 
Indeed, because India may have enough material for 
a minimum deterrent, it could be more amenable to 
signing a fissile material cutoff treaty, or observing a 
global or regional moratorium on the production of 
weapons-grade fissile material.
Restraining Nuclear Testing in Asia
While having potentially negative implications for 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the nuclear 
agreement with India also has a potentially positive 
implication. It restrains India’s governments—and, 
indirectly, governments in Pakistan and China—
from testing new generations of nuclear weapons 
including thermonuclear weapons. Most of India’s 
nuclear weapons are believed to be first-generation 
fission weapons, and India’s 1998 test of a thermo-
nuclear device was at best a partial success. !us, 
India’s leaders may well seek additional nuclear tests, 
but they have also committed to a moratorium on 
nuclear testing under the civilian nuclear agree-
ment. If they break this moratorium, then they will 
jeopardize India’s ability to import nuclear reactors 
and uranium fuel to meet India’s energy require-
ments. !us, under the civilian nuclear agreement, 
India’s leaders would be more inclined to maintain 
their moratorium on nuclear testing. As long as India 
maintains its test moratorium, Pakistan, and presum-
ably China, will have one less reason to test nuclear 
weapons. 
Cementing a Strategic Partnership
Washington pursued the civilian nuclear agree-
ment to cement its strategic partnership with India. 
It is assumed that a stronger India, and a stronger 
US-India strategic partnership, would help Wash-
ington balance a rising China. Still, the meaning of 
a strategic partnership remains unclear, and the role 
of the nuclear agreement in cementing this strategic 
partnership is also unclear.
In general, a strategic partnership involves greater 
cooperation in political and military affairs. On this 
issue, US-India political, military, and economic 
ties were steadily expanding even before the nuclear 
agreement was in place. Since the early 2000s, the 
two countries regularly conducted military exercises 
involving all three branches of their armed forces; 
their navies jointly patrolled the Straits of Malacca; 
there was some intelligence sharing between the two 
countries; and India began purchasing American 
military equipment. !is included artillery-finding 
radars, a naval combat vessel, six transport aircraft, 
and eight long range maritime patrol aircraft. 
Further, the two countries cooperated more closely in 
global security affairs. In 2005–06, India voted twice 
with the United States on resolutions against Iran’s 
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Table 1 India’s Projected Nuclear Power Expansion 
PHWRs (MW) LWR (MW) Breeder 
reactor (MW)
Total Nuclear 
Capacity (GW)
Nuclear Share 
of Electrical 
Capacity
2007 3800 320 4 3.2%
2012 4460 2320 500 7 3.7–4 %
c. 2020 10000 2320 1000–2000 14 4–6 %
c.2020 plus imports ” 10000 ” 24 7–10%
c. 2030 14000 40000 ? ~60 8–15 %
PHWR: Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor
LWR: Light Water Reactor (includes two US-supplied plants at Tarapur that generate 320 megawatts).
Source: Author’s projections, based on compound annual growth rates varying from 4.3% to 8% for India’s total installed 
electrical generating capacity.
nuclear program at the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (India would not have voted against Iran if 
the nuclear agreement with the US was not under 
consideration). 
It is quite possible that US-India political, 
military, and economic ties could have expanded 
even without the nuclear agreement. !e political sig-
nificance of the nuclear agreement is that it removes 
one major obstacle to closer US-India strategic ties, 
i.e. their differences over India’s nuclear weapons 
program.
Economic, Energy, and Environmental Issues
India’s economy has grown at a rate of six to eight 
percent annually in the past decade. If this growth 
rate is maintained, then India’s demand for electric-
ity is expected to increase considerably. !e nuclear 
agreement could provide an important, and environ-
mentally-friendly, energy source for a growing Indian 
economy. It could also offer export opportunities for 
international nuclear suppliers.
India’s existing nuclear power reactors can gener-
ate some 4,400 megawatt of electricity (but because 
of uranium fuel constraints noted below, they only 
operated at fifty to sixty percent of their capac-
ity during the 2000s). In addition, two Russian-
built 1000 megawatt light water reactors and an 
Indian-built 500 megawatt breeder reactor would 
be complete by 2011. !ereafter, DAE expects to 
build eight 700 megawatt reactors. !us, by 2020, 
India’s nuclear sector could generate some 14,000 
megawatt of electricity, but DAE still plans to import 
several 1,000 megawatt reactors to meet its targets 
of generating 20,000 megawatt of electricity by 
2020. !e civilian nuclear agreement enabled India 
to import these reactors. According to press reports, 
over the next two decades, India would develop 
several energy parks each having six to ten nuclear 
reactors. !ese planned parks would be located 
at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, with six Russian 
reactors generating 6800 MW; Jaitapur in Maharash-
tra, with six French Areva reactors generating 9600 
MW; Mithi Virdi in Gujarat, with Westinghouse 
AP1000 reactors; Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh, with 
General Electric-Hitachi reactors; and Haripur in 
West Bengal, with four Russian reactors generating 
4800 MW.
Further, the civilian nuclear agreement will allow 
India to import uranium fuel for its reactors. In the 
2000s, because of the limited scale of its uranium 
mills, India’s reactors operated at only 50 to 60 
percent of their capacity. In 2010, two of India’s 
reactors, the Rajasthan-5 and -6, were placed under 
safeguards and fuelled with imported uranium. In the 
future, while India will expand its uranium milling 
capacity, it will also build more reactors, and India 
would therefore benefit from continued uranium 
imports. !is would provide additional commercial 
opportunities for uranium suppliers such as Canada 
and Australia and countries in Africa.
It should be clarified that the cost of nuclear 
energy is generally greater than that from coal-fired 
plants. However, economies of scale (whereby four 
to eight nuclear plants are built at a single location) 
and environmental savings may make nuclear energy 
more competitive compared to other forms of energy. 
!us, if India’s energy planners find nuclear energy 
affordable, and they opt to import nuclear reactors in 
the coming decade, then nuclear power could make 
modest contributions to India’s energy grid. 
As shown in Table 1, nuclear plants could con-
tribute some 3.7–4 percent of India’s electricity by 
2012. By 2020, with the completion of eight Indian-
built 700 megawatt reactors but no nuclear reactor 
imports, nuclear energy could contribute some 4 to 
6 percent of India’s electricity; with the import of ten 
1000 megawatt light water reactors, it could contrib-
ute some 7 to 10 percent of India’s electricity.
India’s increasing reliance on nuclear energy 
could have positive environmental implications, but 
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the magnitude of these environmental gains would 
be modest. In general (as noted by David Victor in 
his Testimony before the US Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources in July 2006), every 
10,000 megawatt of new nuclear energy capacity 
translates into a carbon-dioxide reduction of some 
75 million tons. !us, if India increases its nuclear 
generating capacity by 20,000 megawatt (as it plans 
to do by 2020–2025), then these new nuclear plants, 
if they were to substitute for coal-fired plants, would 
lessen India’s carbon dioxide emissions by about 150 
million tons per year. If it increases its nuclear capac-
ity by 40,000 megawatt (as it plans to do by 2030), 
then the carbon dioxide savings would be 300 million 
tons per year. !ese reductions are small compared 
to India’s total carbon-dioxide emissions—which 
are expected to be about 1300–1600 million tons 
by 2010–2015 and 2000 million tons by 2025, as 
shown in Table 2. However, they compare favorably 
to reductions planned by other states (emission cuts 
planned by the European Union under the Kyoto 
Protocol are some 200 million tons per year).
Conclusions
!e nuclear agreement with India could, ultimately, 
have either positive or negative strategic and eco-
nomic consequences. !e main negative consequence 
is that it undermines a very important rule in the 
nonproliferation regime. !is negative consequence 
can be offset by positive consequences, or can be 
exacerbated by further negative consequences.
!e nuclear agreement with India will have net 
positive consequences for India, the United States, 
and other countries if the following take place 
over the next five to ten years: India maintains its 
moratorium on nuclear testing and joins the test ban 
treaty; ends its production of weapons grade fissile 
material and eventually joins a future fissile material 
cutoff treaty; strengthens its strategic partnership 
with Washington; and imports a significant number 
of nuclear reactors which would provide a modest 
amount of energy for its economy, benefit the global 
environment, and offer export opportunities for 
nuclear supplier countries.
On the other hand, if India expands its nuclear 
arsenal and possibly also tests nuclear weapons, but 
still benefits from large-scale civilian nuclear imports, 
the nonproliferation regime would be significantly 
undermined. However, any civilian nuclear imports 
could still be beneficial for India’s economy, the world 
environment, and international nuclear suppli-
ers. If India does not undertake large-scale nuclear 
imports—because its three-phase indigenous nuclear 
program becomes viable, imported nuclear energy 
becomes too expensive, or its economic growth 
slows—then the economic and environmental ben-
efits of the nuclear agreement would be lessened.
In summary, India’s decisions on restraining its 
nuclear weapons programs, aligning more closely 
with Washington, and importing significant quanti-
ties of nuclear energy, would ultimately determine 
whether the civilian nuclear agreement with India 
would have positive or negative consequences. 
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Table 2 Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Projections (Million Metric Tons)
2003 2010 2015 2020 2025
China  3,541  5,857  7,000  8,159  9,349
United States  5,796  6,365  6,718  7,119  7,587
India  1,023  1,369  1,592  1,799  2,008
OECD Europe  4,264  4,474  4,632  4,741  4,909
Total World 25,028 30,362 33,663 36,748 40,045
Source: Energy Information Agency, Annual Energy Outlook 2006 (US Department of Energy, Washington, DC, June 2006; 
Report #: DOE/EIA-0484(2006))
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Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: 
Revisiting Indian and Pakistani 
Options
by  T.S .  GOPI RETHINARAJ and  
CLIFFORD E.  S INGER
Development of nuclear weapons by states hinges on 
three principal ingredients: fissile materials, nuclear 
explosives testing data, and delivery systems and 
platforms. With the exception of North Korea’s tests 
in October 2006 and May 2009, there has been a 
de facto moratorium on nuclear explosions observed 
by all other countries since 1998. !e moratorium 
on nuclear explosions is reinforced by India normal-
izing its relations on nuclear technology with the rest 
of the world. Since delivery systems and platforms 
also have conventional roles, stopping fissile material 
production for nuclear explosives remains the key 
indicator of countries’ willingness to halt nuclear 
arms build-ups. However, achieving a global produc-
tion moratorium of military fissile materials remains 
a major challenge. Although the permanent five 
(P-5) members of the UN Security Council have 
apparently ceased production of fissile material for 
weapons, the same is not true of India and Pakistan. 
!us, ending production of military fissile materials 
in South Asia will effectively achieve a broader pro-
duction moratorium. If the Six-party dialogue with 
North Korea resumes and makes viable progress, and 
the United States and others can convince Israel that 
its current stocks of weapons-usable fissile materials 
are adequate, then a comprehensive global produc-
tion moratorium might even be achieved.
Impediments for an FMCT
!e importance of ending military fissile material 
production was recognized as early as 1946 under the 
Baruch Plan, which sought elimination of nuclear 
weapons and international ownership of civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Not surprisingly, that 
proposal was unacceptable to the Soviet Union when 
the United States had such a large lead in the military 
sphere. Although several such proposals were sug-
gested in the ensuing period, it was only after the end 
of the Cold War that proposals for a fissile materials 
production cutoff treaty (FMCT) received serious 
international attention. In 1993 the United Nations 
General Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 
48/75L which called for negotiations for a “non-
discriminatory, multinational and internationally and 
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
explosive devices” (UNGA 1993). !e commitment 
of the parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) was in principle reiterated upon the indefinite 
extension of that treaty. At that point negotiation of 
an FMCT was identified as the next order of business 
after opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
But FMCT discussions at the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in the past have 
been stalled except for a brief period in 1998. Both 
formally and substantively, the impasse has been over 
the linkage between negotiating an FMCT, forma-
tion of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Future of 
Nuclear Weapons, and what to do about Prevention 
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (Singer 
and Sands 2002). !e brief 1998 thaw at the CD fol-
lowed the agreement of the United States and Russia 
to finally agree to the demand of non-weapons-states 
parties to the NPT on the Ad Hoc Working Group. 
However, when the U.S. Congress insisted on 
national missile defense deployment when techni-
cally feasible, China and Russia at first demanded 
simultaneous negotiation for PAROS and an FMCT. 
Although China has apparently stopped production 
of military fissile materials after 1993 (Albright et al. 
1997), it was unwilling to commit to a cap on pro-
duction in the face of potentially unlimited build-up 
of missile defenses by the United States.
Subsequently China and Russia indicated support 
for a PAROS negotiating mandate not necessar-
ily incompatible with U.S. national missile defense 
plans. Later they also agreed to discussing the PAROS 
negotiating mandate with the FMCT text that was 
being negotiated, rather than simultaneously negoti-
ating on PAROS and FMCT. By this time, however, 
the position of the 2001-2008 U.S. administration 
was that there was nothing that it could conceive of 
negotiating on PAROS—a position incompatible 
with unblocking the impasse at the CD. Towards the 
end of that administration it suggested uncoupling 
working on the FMCT from the rest of the CD 
agenda. But this suggestion has not struck enough of 
a resonance to allow any progress. Nuclear weapons 
states viewed the FMCT more as a useful non-pro-
liferation tool than as a genuine confidence building 
measure among states to set the stage for serious 
nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations. 
Hence they have typically insisted on a ban on future 
production of fissile materials for military use rather 
than reducing existing military fissile inventories. 
!e United States and Russia have a huge excess 
of military stocks over what they need to maintain 
their current arsenals. Since P-5 states and Israel have 
accumulated adequate fissile stocks for military use 
(IPFM 2008), and the North Korean situation is 
being negotiated separately, the most important effect 
of a broader moratorium or ban on future production 
will be a halt to the growing military fissile invento-
ries of India and Pakistan.
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With a new U.S. administration in 2009 placing a 
stronger emphasis on multilateral cooperation, there 
is greater likelihood that the impasse over the three 
parts of the CD agenda could be unblocked. Even 
before taking office, the incoming U.S. president 
declared his interest in working towards a world 
without nuclear weapons, a stance which he reiter-
ated in an April 2009 speech in Prague. So the ques-
tion of discussion of the future of nuclear weapons 
in an Ad Hoc Working Group in the CD should not 
resurface amongst the P-5 to create an impasse as 
long as the other P-5 countries do not change their 
positions on the matter.
Concerning PAROS, it is clearly in the near-term 
interests of the United States and the long-term 
interests of mankind to avoid deliberate production 
of dangerous long-lived space debris. Of particular 
concern are geosynchronous orbits, and polar orbits 
in the 700–1000 km altitude range that are heavily 
used by the United States for reconnaissance. If a 
satellite in one of these orbits is shattered by kinetic 
impact it can produce a sizeable number of pieces 
of linear dimension from about 1-10 centimeters, a 
size of debris both dangerous and difficult to detect. 
!e resulting debris can cause a cascade of further 
impacts with other satellites that can make large 
and valuable regions of space almost unusable with 
current technology and be a serious nuisance for 
hundreds or even thousands of years. Acting in its 
own interest, the United States would never precipi-
tate such a calamity in any case, but could instead use 
other means to temporarily or permanently disable 
a satellite if it deemed that step absolutely essential. 
It is thus in the interests of the United States, and 
arguably of mankind as a whole, to reach an inter-
national consensus against the deliberate production 
of long-lived space debris in valuable orbits. Hence 
there is at least one question that could be worth 
negotiating under the PAROS banner at the CD in 
the near term. !e CD should thus be able to turn 
its attention to the substantive issues that need to be 
dealt with concerning production of fissile materials 
for nuclear explosives programs.
!ere are three substantive issues likely to arise 
during FMCT negotiations: existing stocks, naval 
propulsion, and verification. Table 1 provides 
estimates, in some cases very approximate, of total 
separated plutonium inventories, excluding pluto-
nium still entrained in reactor spent fuel. Pakistan has 
in the past suggested an interest in more transpar-
ency, i.e. on the part of India, but India has not been 
responsive. France has in the past been reluctant 
to be as transparent on weapons grade plutonium 
stocks as the United Kingdom. !e United States has 
been transparent about plutonium but shown some 
reluctance when it comes to highly enriched uranium 
(HEU). Despite extensive cooperation with the 
United States under the cooperative threat reduction 
program, Russia is yet to produce a full accounting 
of its military fissile inventory on a facility-by-facility 
basis. On plutonium there is also some ambiguity 
about which nuclear reactor discharges are potentially 
useful for nuclear weapons, especially in the case of 
early discharges from on-line refuelled heavy water 
reactors. Most plutonium separated from commercial 
reactor spent fuel would be of little use to countries 
having adequate weapons grade plutonium, ideally 
consisting of 93 percent or more plutonium-239. 
However, there could be endless debate about both 
accounting for overall plutonium stocks and the 
utility of lower grade material for weapons programs. 
!us the question of existing stocks will have to be 
finessed by some unilateral and largely symbolic 
increases in transparency, without the CD entering 
deeper into this tangled thicket.
Table 1 Global Civil and Military Fissile Material 
Inventories not in Spent Fuel (IPFM 2008)
Country HEU (MT) Plutonium (MT)
Russia 1270 187.4
United States 741 91.9
China 20 4
France 36.4 57.4
UK 22.4 84.8
India 0.6 7.08
Pakistan 2 0.09
Israel 0.1 0.6
North Korea 0.037
Japan 44.7
Belgium 0.6
Germany 15
Others 10
Total 2103 494
!e use of uranium enriched to over 20 percent 
in uranium-235 for naval propulsion will also need 
to be dealt with in the CD. Naval reactor fuel is 
tied to the question of existing stocks because of the 
use of higher than weapon grade uranium by some 
countries to achieve compact and long-lived cores. 
Particularly, the U.S. Navy has preferred designs of 
reactor cores that can last for a few decades or even 
the entire life time of a ship. And moving to lower 
enrichment and shorter refuelling cycles will have 
some impact on planning logistics and operational 
cycles of navies currently using bomb grade uranium 
for naval propulsion. 
Although it is possible to use plutonium cores for 
naval propulsion, uranium cores have remained the 
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preferred option of all nuclear navies. !e annual 
requirement of the entire U.S. naval reactor fleet 
comprising 158 reactors is around 1 ton of highly 
enriched uranium (National Research Council 1995). 
Current stocks of uranium enriched to 93 percent or 
more in the United States and Russia should meet 
their naval propulsion needs for well over a century. 
!e United States has apparently decided that this 
level of enrichment should be adequate for future 
naval propulsion needs even though enrichment to 
about 97 percent has been used for this purpose. !e 
UK will follow the U.S. lead as long as their special 
relationship ties their nuclear submarine programs 
together. Other countries appear to be willing to use 
lower enrichment for naval propulsion. 
Uranium enrichment for India’s naval propulsion 
program will be over the 20 percent limit, but still 
well below the threshold needed to be of practical use 
for fission explosives. As a country that already has 
convenient access to weapon grade plutonium, India 
does not need to object to restrictions on very high 
enrichment levels for naval reactor fuel. Pakistan’s 
problem is quite different from other countries. 
Although it doesn’t have any program for naval 
nuclear propulsion, Pakistan could fiercely resist 
restrictions on uranium enrichment levels because of 
its principal reliance on highly enriched uranium for 
its weapons stockpile. From a Pakistani perspective, 
restrictions on uranium enrichment levels—even if 
designed in the context of naval reactor fuel—will 
impact it more than any other country. 
Another obstacle to halting the production of 
highly enriched uranium is the use of this material 
for thermonuclear weapons. But this is unlikely to be 
of substantial military relevance, for the P-5 countries 
with their already adequate stocks, nor for others in 
the absence of further nuclear explosives testing. Still, 
this consideration and the naval propulsion conun-
drum suggests that an outright permanent ban on 
uranium enrichment above the twenty percent level 
is unlikely to be forthcoming. !e U.S. Navy would 
likely object on principle, and such an approach 
would be unacceptable to India and Pakistan for 
different reasons. What should be compatible with 
naval propulsion plans is an extended moratorium 
on uranium enrichment all the way up to typical 
weapons grade, pending discussions on how a more 
comprehensive verification regime might eventually 
be built.
Finally, designing an acceptable verification 
regime is likely to be the most serious technically 
complicated impediment to entry into force of an 
FMCT. North Korea balked at more intrusive inspec-
tions in connection with Six-party arrangements. 
Israel’s presumed continuing tritium production 
could make it reluctant to cooperate with an intrusive 
verification system. Verification in India’s partitioned 
system of civil-military nuclear facilities is likely to 
present peculiar challenges and difficulties. It could 
also be difficult to obtain the needed two-thirds 
majority in the U.S. Senate, with some senators 
concerned about both the cost of verification to the 
United States and the adequacy of an international 
verification regime.
!e UN Secretary General has suggested that 
a moratorium on the production of fissile materi-
als for nuclear weapons precede a treaty. In light of 
the above discussion, this appears not only to be a 
sensible suggestion, but also likely the only fea-
sible near-term step. !e general outlines of such a 
moratorium may well be worked out either in the 
CD or in bilateral and multilateral discussions that 
occur in the background as the formal CD process 
proceeds. Ultimately, it will be the level of confi-
dence that can be built up through bilateral and 
multilateral bases that will determine whether or 
not a broader moratorium on production of fissile 
materials for nuclear explosives programs can be 
established and how long it might endure. Possible 
mechanisms include the Six-party talks for Korea, 
discussions between the United States and Israel, 
and understandings between China and one or 
more other countries. !e most critical confidence 
building needed, however, will be between India and 
Pakistan. As these countries are excluded from and 
remain suspicious of the pronouncements that often 
emanate from the NPT review conferences, the CD 
remains the most likely multilateral forum to provide 
political cover for substantive discussions between 
India and Pakistan on fissile materials production and 
avoiding an unbounded nuclear arms competition 
in South Asia. Recent private communications and 
public statements by members of the Pakistani secu-
rity establishment give the impression that the idea 
that Pakistan halting fissile materials production for 
nuclear explosives if India does is understood within 
Pakistan’s national security establishment to be in 
Pakistan’s interest. If so, then the challenge is for the 
Pakistani and Indian political leadership to come to 
the same conclusion and chart a path towards mutual 
participation in a production moratorium. However, 
any India-Pakistan pact on halting fissile material 
production for nuclear explosives is likely to endure 
only if China freezes its nuclear force levels. South 
Asia is unlikely to remain immune to nuclear arms 
build up and nuclear force modernization by China, 
even if they were in response to developments in the 
United States or its relations with other potential 
adversaries. 
India’s Fissile Inventory and Options
India’s military fissile inventory comprises mostly 
plutonium derived from the two production reactors 
(heavy water moderated and cooled reactors) located 
at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) 
 Pakistan could fiercely 
resist restrictions on uranium 
enrichment levels because 
of its principal reliance on 
highly enriched uranium for 
its weapons stockpile.
 Designing an accept-
able verification regime is 
likely to be the most serious 
technically complicated 
impediment to entry into 
force of an FMCT.
27
complex in Mumbai. Most independent assessments 
of India’s military fissile inventory include only these 
two reactors: the Canadian supplied CIRUS (40 
MWth) and the indigenously developed Dhruva 
(100 MWth). !eoretically, India could produce up 
to 50 kg of weapon grade plutonium annually from 
these two reactors alone. But these two reactors also 
have had frequent operational problems, resulting in 
extended shutdowns for maintenance and refurbish-
ment. Since records of actual operational histories of 
these two reactors are classified, as noted above inde-
pendent estimates of fissile inventories are somewhat 
uncertain. 
According to some estimates (Albright et al. 1997; 
IPFM 2008), India could have accumulated around 
600 kg of weapon grade—sufficient for making 
around 100 implosion type weapons—from CIRUS 
and Dhruva. Boosting these weapons with tritium, a 
radioactive isotope of hydrogen produced in reactors, 
can increase the explosive yield by several-fold. A 
1998 report documented the tritium extraction facili-
ties operated by India in these reactors as well as some 
older commercial power reactors for preventing plant 
personnel from excessive exposure to tritium (Rethi-
naraj 1998). India has also produced tritium using 
lithium targets in the two BARC reactors (Iyengar 
1998). Even a few hundred grams of tritium can 
greatly enhance the explosive capabilities of India’s 
modest fissile material inventory. India also has a 
larger inventory of civilian plutonium. About 18 tons 
could be residing in spent fuel discharged from all 
civilian power reactors so far (Bharadwaj, Krishnan, 
and Rajagopal 2008). Estimates of India’s separated 
civilian inventory vary, but at least two tons that 
will be required for the initial core of the 500 MWe 
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) under con-
struction would have been separated. India’s ability to 
reprocess civilian plutonium is currently limited by 
its combined reprocessing capacity of 200 metric tons 
of heavy metal per year at two commercial sites. 
!ere has long been suspicion that India could 
have used some of its civilian reactors by discharging 
fuel at low burn-up to make weapon grade pluto-
nium in order to make up for the production losses 
from CIRUS and Dhruva during their extended 
shutdowns. In that case, the choice of backups for 
CIRUS and Dhruva or even supplemental plutonium 
production are most likely drawn from the eight 
pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) in the 
suggested military list outlined in the March 2006 
civil-military separation offer of nuclear facilities 
by India. However, India’s decision to place more 
PHWRs in the military list is likely mainly to provide 
tritium and also plutonium for the unsafeguarded 
breeder reactor program rather than for an open 
ended weapons build-up. Nevertheless, India retains 
operational flexibility to increase fissile material for 
explosives by operating unsafeguarded reactors at low 
burn-up if desired. 
!e status of the Canadian-supplied CIRUS has 
always been a tricky issue because the plutonium used 
for the 1974 test came from it. However, the legal 
cover of the loosely written bilateral contract between 
India and Canada, which did not prohibit “peaceful 
nuclear explosions,” allowed India to claim flexibility. 
Although India has committed to permanently shut 
down CIRUS in 2010 (Bush and Singh 2005), pluto-
nium produced from this reactor is potentially avail-
able for military purposes. It is plausible that India 
could surprise the world by putting all of CIRUS-
generated plutonium and spent fuel under safeguards 
as a confidence building measure, if other plutonium 
stocks were considered adequate. Another possibility 
is to use the weapon grade plutonium, uranium-
233, or both produced in the breeder reactor (under 
construction) to augment future stocks. India could 
produce up to 150 kg of weapons grade plutonium 
annually in the axial and radial blankets of 500 MWe 
PFBR (Glaser and Ramana 2007). !is estimate, 
which is based on a capacity factor of 75 percent, 
is very high and not compatible to the operational 
history of plutonium-fueled breeders in the past. It is 
more likely that India’s PFBR will have a substantially 
lower availability during the first decade of operation, 
but even 25 percent availability could substantially 
increase the rate of production of weapons grade 
fissile material.
India’s uranium enrichment capacity is relatively 
modest. !ere are two uranium enrichment plants 
in India: a pilot scale facility in the main BARC 
complex and a commercial scale facility near Mysore 
in Karnataka. !ere is no information in the public 
domain about their operational status and history. 
According to one independent estimate, the Karna-
taka facility could have produced around 1000 kg of 
highly enriched uranium at the end of 2006 (Mian 
et al. 2006). !e enrichment level reached at this 
facility is far lower than weapon grade uranium com-
position and intended mainly for the naval reactor 
program that is underway. Another estimate suggests 
that India’s HEU inventory could be 460-700 kg 
(Albright et al. 1997). 
India has set in motion various programs to 
develop nuclear warheads and delivery systems. 
Although the intent to develop a “credible minimum 
deterrent” nuclear force is official, details about the 
desired force levels and its subsequent integration 
with the military remain sketchy or classified. !e 
Indian government released an official “Draft Nuclear 
Doctrine” in August 1999 outlining a nuclear 
weapons policy based on “no first use” and “cred-
ible minimum deterrent” provisions. Some Indian 
analysts privy to the decision-making apparatus 
have blamed successive governments for not taking 
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weaponization seriously and warn that “perils of half-
measures” will erode India’s deterrent value against 
China and also Pakistan in the long run (Karnad 
2005). !ere is also concern amongst the strategic 
community that India’s current military fissile stocks 
are inadequate to produce a credible deterrent against 
China. China’s estimated military plutonium inven-
tory is roughly five times greater than India’s and its 
estimated HEU inventory is thirty times larger (See 
Table 1). Moreover, included in India’s plutonium 
stocks is the large civilian stockpile (not ideally 
suited for weapons) that is slated for use in the 500 
MWe fast breeder reactor under construction. More 
generally, from an Indian perspective, the willingness 
of P-5 states to start FMCT talks emerges from the 
luxury of having amassed valuable data from several 
nuclear tests besides sitting on top of much larger 
military fissile stocks than needed. !e net result is 
resistance in India to a fissile material production 
cut-off that may be sufficient to delay a moratorium 
until after several years of additional production. 
India is also unlikely to ratify an FMCT until more 
progress has been made on a global build-down of 
nuclear weapons holdings.
Pakistan’s Fissile Inventory and Options
Pakistan’s military fissile inventory comprises mostly 
weapon grade uranium derived from the pilot-scale 
uranium enrichment plant operating since 1971 
at Sihala and the larger production facility operat-
ing since 1981 at Kahuta (Steer 1998). !ese two 
plants were built largely with the aid of an inter-
national smuggling network operated by former 
URENCO employee A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani 
scientist credited with building the country’s nuclear 
weapons program. Pakistan’s weapons grade uranium 
stockpile is estimated at around two metric tons 
(IPFM 2008). Since 1973 Pakistan has operated the 
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)—a heavy 
water reactor built with Canadian assistance—under 
international safeguards. Recent evidence indicates 
that Pakistan has also accumulated modest quanti-
ties of weapons grade plutonium, but the source of 
this plutonium is the 50 MWth reactor at Khushab 
built with Chinese assistance in 1998. !ere is very 
little information about the details and operational 
history of this reactor, but an independent assessment 
claims this facility could have produced up to 90 kg 
of weapons grade plutonium over the last ten years 
(IPFM 2008). 
Although Pakistan has adequate fissile mate-
rial stocks for producing perhaps about a hundred 
nuclear weapons, its approach to FMCT discus-
sions in the past has been calibrated by India’s and 
not just Pakistan’s own capabilities. If one were to 
exclude India’s civilian plutonium inventory, as most 
independent estimates do, there may be rough parity 
in nuclear explosive holdings between India and 
Pakistan. But if one includes India’s large civilian plu-
tonium inventory, the balance between the two coun-
tries changes dramatically. !e theoretical weapons 
potential of India’s civilian plutonium inventory and 
operational flexibility to produce weapons grade 
plutonium in its breeder reactor and some of its 
commercial power reactors may not have been lost on 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment. 
Furthermore, the special waiver for India to 
resume international civilian nuclear cooperation will 
be viewed by Pakistan as an unfair and destabilizing 
development in the region. !ese realities will have 
a major influence on Pakistan’s approach to FMCT 
if serious discussions begin at the CD in Geneva. 
Pakistan made it clear soon after the 1998 tests that 
its approach to FMCT will be determined by the 
pace and degree of India’s weaponization programs 
and the size and quality of its fissile material inven-
tory. It is not yet clear if Pakistan will cite India’s 
civilian plutonium inventory, which will remain 
outside safeguards under the civil-military separa-
tion plan, and refuse to become a party to an FMCT 
or production moratorium. While Pakistan may be 
content with the status quo, any future Indian plans 
to significantly increase its stockpile to counter China 
will result in a perception in Islamabad about the 
erosion of Pakistan’s  own deterrent capability. But 
Pakistan’s dependence on U.S. aid will also limit the 
extent to which it can influence a multilateral process 
if there emerges a broad consensus on this question. 
But Pakistan’s dependence on U.S. aid could limit the 
extent to which it can influence a multilateral process 
if there emerges a broad consensus on this question, 
and at some point Pakistan’s cooperation with U.S. 
goals concerning the Taliban no longer trumps other 
considerations.
NPT Non-Weapons States
!e question of cutting off production of unsafe-
guarded weapons grade materials in countries that 
actually have produced them needs to be clearly 
limited to those countries. Today adding Iran to 
the discussion of the former set can easily scuttle 
progress; but several other NPT signatories have 
also been a concern, and more NPT non-weapons 
state signatories may yet pursue spent fuel reprocess-
ing or uranium enrichment programs with dubious 
economic benefits. However, unless and until another 
country actually joins the nine countries that claim 
not to be non-weapons-state NPT signatories, only 
fog, obfuscation and a higher chance of stalemate will 
result from throwing other countries into the discus-
sion of the cutting off unsafeguarded production of 
weapons grade fissile materials.
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Conclusion: South Asia and FMCT Future 
To summarize, the current situation is more propi-
tious than ever for progress on a broader moratorium 
on production of fissile materials for nuclear explo-
sives programs. With a new U.S. administration, the 
deadlock between China and others and the United 
States in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament 
should be resolvable. !e United States should now 
be amenable to discussions proceeding in an Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Future of Nuclear Weapons. 
At the minimum, it should be possible for the United 
States to admit the possibility of discussion of at least 
one item as a part of a possible negotiation mandate 
on PAROS: an agreement against the deliberate 
production of dangerous long-lived space debris in 
valuable orbits.
!e actual nearer term outcome of a process of 
negotiating over an FMCT is more likely to be a 
broader moratorium than entry into force of a treaty 
with a full-blown international verification regime. 
!e question of existing stocks of weapons-usable 
fissile materials could be finessed via unilateral 
initiatives on somewhat increased transparency. !e 
question of enriched uranium for naval propulsion 
should be manageable by starting with a moratorium, 
e.g. designed to last twenty-five years or more, on 
enrichment all of the way to weapon grade. Instead 
of an elaborate universal verification regime, what is 
likely to be more manageable is a set of bilateral and 
multilateral confidence building measures. As the 
experience with the comprehensive nuclear test ban 
suggests, there may be a period of decades between 
the onset of a broader moratorium and the entry into 
force, if ever, of a corresponding treaty.
It can also be helpful if the United States and 
Russia restart and convey the impression of continu-
ing progress on building down of their Cold War 
nuclear arsenals. But the key to a broader mora-
torium on fissile material production for nuclear 
explosives programs lies in India and Pakistan 
deciding that participation is in any case in their 
own best interests, and of course China not unwit-
tingly precipitating nuclear arms build-up by India. 
From the point of view of Pakistan’s national security 
establishment, with India poised for a major expan-
sion of production capability the time may be ripe for 
a mutual understanding, provided that India decides 
that what is meant by “minimum deterrence” is 
compatible with its existing stocks when a produc-
tion moratorium starts. !ese are of course only 
sufficient conditions. An appropriate opportunity 
when such a confidence building measure is attractive 
to both India’s and Pakistan’s governments will need 
to present itself, and the international community 
will have previously had to lay the groundwork for 
such a decision to fit adequately within the broader 
international context.
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The following is a chronology from 1998 onwards of 
selected events related to nuclear weapons develop-
ment and nuclear policy in India and Pakistan, as 
well as notable acts of proliferation and efforts at 
non-proliferation affecting the region of South Asia.
April 6, 1998 Pakistan test-fires 937-mile range Ghauri missile, which it says can carry nuclear 
warheads and is meant to deter India.
May 11, 1998 India sets off three nuclear devices at the Pokhran test range. The testing project is 
codenamed Operation Shakti (“strength”).
May 13, 1998 India conducts a second round of tests at Pokhran, detonating two nuclear devices 
with sub-kiloton yields. The US imposes economic sanctions against India.
May 15, 1998 Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says the country is capable of making a 
“big bomb” that would be used to defend the country.
May 17, 1998 US President Bill Clinton issues a fresh appeal to Pakistan to forgo nuclear tests.
May 18, 1998 An Indian cabinet minister warns Pakistan against trying to boost a separatist 
Muslim insurgency in Kashmir.
May 19, 1998 Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif charges that India has threatened to attack 
the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir.
May 21, 1998 India announces a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. It claims it is 
willing to negotiate an agreement on a formal test ban.
May 27, 1998 India revises its blanket declaration that it would not use nuclear weapons first in 
any conflict.
May 28, 1998 Pakistan conducts its first nuclear tests, five in all. President Clinton says the US is 
forced by law to impose sanctions on Pakistan and India.
May 29, 1998 Pakistani officials declare that they would not hesitate to employ nuclear weapons 
in response to an attack.
May 30, 1998 Pakistan detonates another nuclear device with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The 
tests were conducted at Baluchistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to 
six. 
June 1, 1998 A newspaper report quotes a top Pakistani scientist as saying that the country has 
developed a new medium-range missile for nuclear warheads.
July 1, 1998 A former Pakistani nuclear weapons engineer warns that his country’s top military 
and intelligence officials discussed plans for a preemptive nuclear strike on New 
Delhi.
July 30, 1998 The prime ministers of India and Pakistan agree to a new round of security talks 
but appear as divided as ever about the disputed territory of Kashmir.
October 1998 Pakistan and India end their first peace talks in a year with agreement to meet 
again the following February in New Delhi.
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Late 1990s Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s network starts supplying centrifuges and 
depleted uranium hexafluoride to North Korea.
February 21, 1999 India and Pakistan agree to work to reduce the risk of a nuclear war by exchanging 
strategic information about their arsenals and giving each other advance notice of 
ballistic-missile tests.
May 26, 1999 India launches a series of airstrikes at armed Muslim infiltrators in the Kargil 
district of Indian-administered Kashmir. Indian authorities say Pakistan had helped 
several hundred of them cross into the territory.
May 27, 1999 Pakistan’s armed forces report having shot down two Indian fighter jets over the 
Pakistani-controlled portion of Kashmir, marking a sharp escalation of military ten-
sions between the world’s two newest nuclear powers.
June 11, 1999 One day after accusing the Pakistani army of torturing and executing six Indian 
soldiers, India says it has tapes of telephone conversations showing that Pakistani 
army officials are running military operations against Indian forces in Kashmir.
June 1999 Weeks of border skirmishes erupt between Pakistan and India over Muslim militant 
infiltrators who seized hilltop positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control. 
Fighting continues until July, with the US helping to ease tensions.
August 18, 1999 India’s National Security Advisory Board releases a Draft Nuclear Doctrine, under 
which only the elected prime minister could authorize a nuclear strike and which 
would allow India to use such weapons only if attacked by another nuclear power.
February 2000 Pakistan establishes National Command Authority, responsible for control over the 
country’s strategic nuclear assets and policy formulation.
September 12, 2000 Pakistan accedes to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
which obliges member states to ensure physical protection of nuclear material 
during international transport.
2001 Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf removes A.Q. Khan as head of Pakistan’s 
nuclear programs and names him as scientific adviser to the president.
September 23, 2001 Following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, the US lifts all remaining 
nuclear related sanctions against India and Pakistan.
2002 India and Pakistan close to war after December 2001 attack on parliament in New 
Delhi blamed on Pakistani-based militants.
March 12, 2002 India accedes to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
January 2003 India announces the formalization of its nuclear doctrine, making public a set of 
political principles and administrative arrangements (including establishment of a 
Nuclear Command Authority) to manage its arsenal of nuclear weapons. 
December 2003 Pakistan says it is questioning nuclear scientists, including A.Q. Khan, over allega-
tions of proliferation. It says it is acting on information from Iran and Libya passed 
on by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency.
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January 2004 Probe leads to removal of A.Q. Khan as adviser to Pakistan’s prime minister.
February 2, 2004 Senior military official says Khan makes statement confessing to supplying 
designs, hardware and materials used to make enriched uranium for atomic 
bombs to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
February 4, 2004 Khan appears on state television to make personal apology to the nation for endan-
gering national security by leaking nuclear secrets abroad.
May 22, 2004 The Commonwealth announces that Pakistan will be re-admitted after a five-year 
ban. Pakistan was suspended after Musharraf’s 1999 coup.
June 19, 2004 India and Pakistan resume talks on easing nuclear tensions and identifying 
confidence building measures between the two countries. The talks had been 
suspended soon after the 2001 attack on India’s parliment. 
2005 Pakistan launches its first long-range nuclear-capable missile and its first cruise 
missile.
July 18, 2005 A joint statement by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President 
George W. Bush announces that the two countries have reached a framework 
agreement to enable civilian nuclear trade between them.
Summer 2006 Construction of a third plutonium reactor begins at Khushab in Pakistan. It is 
similar in size to the country’s second plutonium reactor.
November 2006 Pakistan successfully test-fires a new version of its medium-range, nuclear-capa-
ble missile.
February 2007 India and Pakistan sign an agreement designed to reduce the risk of nuclear war 
between the countries.
September 2008 The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group decides to exempt India from certain commercial 
restrictions.
October 8, 2008 President Bush signs the U.S.-India 123 agreement, which implements bilateral 
nuclear trade.
July 26, 2009 India launches its first nuclear-powered submarine, the Arihant (“destroyer of 
enemies”). The launch date coincides with the tenth anniversary of the end of the 
Kargil War between India and Pakistan.
August 27, 2009 K. Santhanam, a senior scientist in India’s Defense Research and Development 
Organization, says that India’s test in 1998 of a thermonuclear device was a fizzle. 
He asserts that the country should be prepared to test again and should refrain 
from signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
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